# Risk-Register Proposals — BGD (2026-06-23)

**Pipeline run:** 1851bd26-dd38-41cd-8d63-42e02655a14a  
**Pending proposals:** 1

## Proposal 1 — add (risk)

**Proposed title:** Government policy hardening on Rohingya presence restricting WFP operational access in Cox's Bazar  
**Proposed type:** Strategic / 1.2 External relationship / 1.2.2 Misalignment with UN system, governments, partners and non-state actors  
**Event:** The Bangladesh interim government formally tightens policy on the Rohingya presence — including restrictions on movement, camp access conditions, or burden-sharing demands — in ways that constrain WFP's ability to register, verify, and deliver assistance to the 1.1–1.2 million Rohingya caseload in Cox's Bazar.  
**Cause:** Sustained international underfunding of the Rohingya response (JRP 2026 food sector at 26%-reduced appeal; WFP ration cuts of ~50% since April 2025) has eroded the government's confidence in the multilateral burden-sharing framework; Bangladesh's Home Minister has explicitly framed the Rohingya caseload as a national security threat, and the Arakan Army's consolidation of Rakhine townships has rendered voluntary repatriation channels operationally obsolete, removing the government's primary political off-ramp.  
**Effect:** WFP faces curtailed field access, renegotiated or suspended operational permissions, or reduced government cooperation on camp governance and supply-route clearance, disrupting food and nutrition assistance to over one million refugees and exposing the CO to reputational, fiduciary and programme delivery risks.  
**Distinct from:** BGD-R001, BGD-R006, BGD-R002  
**Justification:** The register already captures political transition disruption (BGD-R001, focused on demonstrations and curfews), sudden cross-border arrival surges (BGD-R006), and funding shortfalls (BGD-R002). None of these covers the distinct and recurring intelligence signal of deliberate, policy-driven host-government restriction of WFP's operating space for the Rohingya response. Evidence id=59 explicitly records the Home Minister framing the caseload as a national security threat and signalling policy hardening. Evidence id=135 documents that the Arakan Army's control of 14 of 17 Rakhine townships has made repatriation channels obsolete, removing the government's political exit option and increasing pressure on the hosting framework. Evidence id=115 and id=111 confirm the political transition creates uncertainty around government partnerships across all WFP programme lines and that ACLED-recorded political violence is rising. The causal chain — chronic underfunding eroding burden-sharing confidence → government securitisation of the Rohingya issue → access restrictions on WFP operations — is well-evidenced and operationally distinct from the existing risks. The R2 type 1.2.2 (Misalignment with UN system, governments, partners and non-state actors) is the correct fit because the risk is a breakdown in the cooperative relationship with the host government, not a conflict event or a funding gap per se. Impact is scored 4 given that any material restriction on camp access would immediately affect over one million beneficiaries; likelihood is 3 given documented political signalling but no formal restriction yet enacted.  
**Evidence (country_intelligence_py id):** 59  
> ###JSON###
{"country":"Bangladesh","keyStats":{"nfr":"USD 8.85M net funding requirement (Apr–Sep 2026); JRP 2026 food sector: USD 247.3M against a 26%-reduced appeal of USD 710.5M","currentReach":"1.14M people assisted (per WFP Country Brief, April 2026 operations)","ipc":"15.5M people IPC Phase 3+ 

_change_proposal_id: 532c675a-31b3-4e63-9609-91bbbd97e3d5_