# Risk-Register Proposals — BGD (2026-06-23)

**Pipeline run:** e9f9c94e-08d9-4798-8367-e5579d25cabc  
**Pending proposals:** 1

## Proposal 1 — add (risk)

**Proposed title:** Government policy hardening on Rohingya presence restricting WFP operational access in Cox's Bazar  
**Proposed type:** Strategic / 1.2 External relationship / 1.2.2 Misalignment with UN system, governments, partners and non-state actors  
**Event:** The Bangladesh interim government imposes new restrictions, suspends approvals, or unilaterally alters the operational framework for humanitarian assistance to Rohingya refugees in Cox's Bazar, limiting WFP's ability to register beneficiaries, distribute food, or maintain programme coverage at current scale.  
**Cause:** The government has explicitly framed the Rohingya caseload as a national security threat amid rising domestic political pressure, declining international burden-sharing, and near-zero repatriation prospects — conditions that incentivise policy hardening, access conditionality, or unilateral reductions in permitted humanitarian footprint.  
**Effect:** WFP loses or is forced to curtail access to part of the 1.17 million Rohingya caseload, triggering assistance gaps, ration reductions beyond those already in place, and reputational and donor-relationship consequences; in extremis, a government-imposed operational suspension would render the CO unable to meet its core protection-of-life mandate for the largest single population it serves.  
**Distinct from:** BGD-R001, BGD-R006, BGD-R009  
**Justification:** The current register covers access disruption from political transition dynamics (BGD-R001, type: Conflict), sudden cross-border arrival surges (BGD-R006, type: Mistimed scale-up/down), and camp-level violence (BGD-R009, type: Insufficient security). None of these captures the distinct risk of the host government itself — acting through policy rather than violence or logistics failure — deliberately constraining or withdrawing consent for WFP operations as a lever in burden-sharing negotiations. Evidence record id=59 provides the sharpest signal: the Home Minister has explicitly and publicly framed the Rohingya presence as a national security threat in direct meetings with the UN RC, and has conditioned continued cooperation on increased international support. Record id=135 closes off the safety valve: with the Arakan Army controlling 14 of 17 Rakhine townships, voluntary repatriation is operationally impossible, meaning the government's frustration will persist and intensify. Record id=111 documents the broader political volatility context (360 ACLED events, 59 fatalities in May 2026, up 19%/37% m-o-m) that could accelerate domestic pressure on the interim government to act against the Rohingya presence. Record id=115 corroborates the political transition uncertainty and government partnership fragility (VWB programme, school feeding). This is a Strategic / External relationship risk — a misalignment between WFP's operational requirements and the host government's evolving policy posture — and is well-evidenced, distinct from existing register entries, and consequential given that the Rohingya response constitutes the dominant share of WFP Bangladesh's caseload and budget.  
**Evidence (country_intelligence_py id):** 59  
> ###JSON###
{"country":"Bangladesh","keyStats":{"nfr":"USD 8.85M net funding requirement (Apr–Sep 2026); JRP 2026 food sector: USD 247.3M against a 26%-reduced appeal of USD 710.5M","currentReach":"1.14M people assisted (per WFP Country Brief, April 2026 operations)","ipc":"15.5M people IPC Phase 3+ 

_change_proposal_id: 444f3d47-48b0-457c-9f98-63f4d366d29d_