Afghanistan Country Risk Update – 2026

Key Stats – Afghanistan 2026

Net Funding Requirements (NFRs):	USD 404M required (Jun–Nov 2026); 8% resourced (~USD 371M gap)
Current Reach:	WFP reached ~2.9M people in April 2026 (latest reported month)
Population IPC 3+:	17.4M in IPC Phase 3+ (proj., Nov 2025–Mar 2026 window)

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Executive Summary

Operational Context:

• Afghanistan faces a compounding humanitarian emergency across funding, logistics, displacement, and natural shocks simultaneously. Famine-prevention programmes in hotspot areas have been suspended since early July 2026, with WFP turning away 13 million acutely hungry Afghans and 1.5 million people in hotspot areas at heightened risk of life-threatening hunger.^[1]
• The Afghanistan–Pakistan border has been closed since 12 October 2025, blocking ~8,800 mt of Specialized Nutritious Food (SNF), biscuits, and vegetable oil. The Dubai–Iran pipeline was simultaneously suspended due to regional conflict, forcing rerouting via the Lapis Lazuli Corridor (Türkiye → Georgia → Azerbaijan → Caspian → Turkmenistan → Afghanistan) and Türkiye–Iran rail at triple the transport cost.^[2]
• The US-Iran military conflict and effective Strait of Hormuz closure — through which ~20% of global oil transits — sustains structural pressure on fuel costs and WFP's logistics spend. Diesel reached AFN 76.5/litre in Week 3 July 2026 (19% above last year; 21% above three-year average), driven by Russian export bans and refinery damage.^[3] The IRGC has publicly conditioned any reopening on changes to US policy, with no resolution in sight.^[4]
• The Trump administration's termination of all US foreign assistance to Afghanistan — previously totalling over USD 3.8 billion since 2021 — removes the largest single donor from Afghanistan's humanitarian architecture with no compensating mechanism.^[5] As of July 2025, SIGAR-25-29-LL alleged WFP staff corruption and bid-rigging; these findings continue to shape residual US re-engagement posture and donor scrutiny in 2026.^[6]
• A 1 September 2026 PoR-holder departure deadline from Pakistan threatens a sharp single-month spike in cross-border flows on top of an already elevated ~25,000+ returns/week average. Cumulative returns from Pakistan since 15 September 2023 total 2,634,942 individuals.^[7] WFP returnee cash assistance was suspended from June 2026 onward after reaching ~54,000 returnees in May 2026.^[2]
• Flash floods struck eastern Afghanistan (20–21 July) damaging agricultural land in Laghman, and central region floods (23 July) displaced hundreds of families across Kabul, Kapisa, Panjshir, Parwan, Logar, and Maidan Wardak. Torkham crossing was disrupted by flooding. Long-term food security risk is confirmed for Paktika (Sharana, Barmal), Paktia (Ahmad Aba, Sayed Karam, Zurmat), Ghazni, and Khost (Spera District) due to destroyed farmland, orchards, and irrigation systems.^[8]

Vulnerability Scale:

• IPC projects 17.4 million people in Phase 3+ (Crisis or worse) for the Nov 2025–Mar 2026 window, including 4.7 million at Phase 4 (Emergency) — a 38% increase over the prior-year observed caseload of 12.6 million.^[9] The October 2025 IPC observed 13.8 million in Phase 3+; the projection is the operative lean-season figure.
• Acute malnutrition affects 3.7 million children under five (including ~1 million with SAM) and 1.2 million pregnant/breastfeeding women — described as the highest levels on record for Afghanistan.^[2]
• Household purchasing power has collapsed: a full-time casual labourer can afford only 48% of the WFP food basket nationally (June 2026); in Nuristan, just 17%. Baghlan is the sole province where monthly labour income covers the basket. Labour availability stands at 1.9 days/week, down 17% year-on-year.^[10]
• Worst-case Scenario S4 (Pakistan border remains closed + Iran conflict intensifies) projects IPC 3+ rising to 16.1 million at six months — 2.3 million additional food-insecure people above the April–September 2026 IPC anchor (2,000 Monte Carlo simulations).^[11] El Niño conditions are simultaneously producing poor vegetation in northwestern and northern regions — a proxy leading indicator for deteriorating livelihoods ahead of the next IPC cycle.^[12]

Trend Indicators:

• Fuel: Diesel +19% year-on-year; cooking oil surged 4.6% in a single week (Week 3 July). The WFP in-kind basket stands at AFN 6,033–6,056 (4.0–4.4% above the October 2025 transfer value of AFN 5,800). No consecutive-week trigger threshold has been breached yet, but sustained pressure from diesel and fertiliser (DAP +17% YoY, Urea +45% YoY) is accelerating.^[3]
• Conflict: ACLED records 69 events and 35 fatalities in July 2026, down 14% in events and 61% in fatalities month-on-month against a 12-month average of 100 events/102 fatalities — a partial tactical de-escalation, though civilian targeting events (35 in July) remain elevated relative to reported fatalities.^[13]
• Real terms of trade for casual labour: 25% below last year and 22% below three-year average as of Week 4 July 2026.^[3] Potato prices are 55% above last year; rice (Palao variety) 22% above three-year average.
• Previously (ACR 2025): WFP received USD 374 million in contributions — down 47% from USD 589 million in 2024 — and was funded at 64% of its reduced needs-based plan. All six Strategic Outcomes underperformed: SO1 reached 93.6% beneficiary achievement at 76.7% expenditure; SO2 reached 75.9% beneficiary achievement at 105.7% expenditure; SO3 reached 33.6% beneficiary achievement at 72.1% expenditure; SO4 reached 66.1% beneficiary achievement at 37.3% expenditure; SO6 (UNHAS) achieved at 94.7% expenditure rate.^[14]

WFP Operations:

• As of April 2026 (per WFP Country Brief May 2026): WFP reached ~2.9 million people — 2.1 million through GFA (6,900 mt food + USD 8.5 million cash), ~128,000 acutely malnourished children and pregnant/breastfeeding women through TSFP (650 mt SNF), ~13,000 children aged 6–23 months through stunting prevention (20 mt SNF), and 440,000+ primary school children in Nangarhar and Farah through school-based assistance.^[2]
• By May 2026 (per WFP Country Brief June 2026), nutrition delivery had collapsed to 10% of planned beneficiaries: ~30,000 reached against a planned caseload of ~300,000 acutely malnourished children and pregnant/breastfeeding women.^[2]
• Resilience and Food Systems activities remain suspended in five districts across Khost, Paktika, Paktya, and Nuristan — removing a protective livelihood layer where conflict exposure is highest and increasing GFA demand in those districts.^[15]
• CBT modality decisions require urgent provincial disaggregation: Nuristan, Daykundi (+14% above national basket), Ghor (+9%), and Nimroz (+9%) require in-kind or enhanced transfer values given structural market failures no CBT can correct.^[10]
• Under the 2018–2027 CSP (now extended through December 2027 with a USD 1.537 billion budget increase), planned annual GFA reach declines from 9 million (2026) to 7.3 million (2027) — projecting continued resource constraint as the structural condition, not a temporary dip.^[16]

Funding Outlook:

• WFP's six-month net funding requirement for June–November 2026: USD 404 million, 8% resourced (~USD 371 million gap). Sequential briefing deterioration: April CB — USD 299 million at 19% resourced; May CB — USD 359 million at 5% resourced; June CB — USD 404 million at 8% resourced.^[2],[15]
• The 2026 HNRP (all partners) requires USD 1.71 billion; only USD 239–241 million received as of April–June 2026 (14%). UNICEF's 2026 HAC appeal (USD 949 million) is 45% funded, with nutrition 78% unfunded and WASH 85% unfunded.^[9]
• The USAID closure removes USD 3.8 billion in cumulative US contributions since 2021 with no replacement architecture of equivalent scale. The EU is debating a more transactional aid model for its next multiyear budget.^[5] The World Bank-funded maternal and child benefit programme (USD 3.5 million) remains operational and represents the sole ring-fenced financing channel to protect.^[2]
• The cumulative CSP funding gap since 2018 stands at 44% (ACR 2025 cumulative frame). Lapis Lazuli Corridor routing at triple cost further compresses the purchasing power of any incoming resources — cost-per-beneficiary assumptions for all nutrition activities require immediate rebasing.^[14]

In The News

• IRGC Declares Strait of Hormuz Effectively Closed (Crisis Group): IRGC conditioning any Hormuz reopening on US policy changes threatens indefinite disruption to WFP's Gulf-routed commodity shipments and sustains fuel cost escalation across all Afghanistan delivery corridors.^[4]
• US Terminates All Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan (The Diplomat): Elimination of USD 3.8 billion in historical US contributions with no compensating architecture accelerates WFP Afghanistan's funding collapse and removes diplomatic leverage over Taliban access conditions.^[5]
• Over 6 Million Afghans Returned Since 2023 (The Diplomat): With 80% involuntarily expelled and a 1 September PoR-holder deadline approaching, WFP faces a returnee surge with zero funded response capacity at border crossing points following June 2026 suspension of cash assistance.^[7]

Potential Risks

Category	Title	Description	Potential Mitigations	Functional Areas	Support Resources	Evidence	Seriousness
Financial	Near-total funding collapse suspending famine-prevention and nutrition	USD 404M six-month requirement (Jun–Nov 2026) is 8% resourced; famine-prevention suspended since early July 2026; 13M people turned away.	1. Emergency resource mobilisation targeting the ~USD 371M gap, prioritising Gulf and non-traditional donors. 2. Protect World Bank MCBP channel (USD 3.5M) as a ring-fenced floor.	Resource Mobilisation, Programme	HQ Donor Relations, RBO	WFP Afghanistan Country Brief, June 2026 (doc_id: 4215709); WFP Afghanistan Country Brief, July 2026 (doc_id: 4221542)	High
Operational	Full nutrition commodity pipeline break across all import corridors	Pak border closed since 12 Oct 2025 (blocking ~8,800 mt SNF/biscuits/oil); Dubai–Iran pipeline suspended; nutrition delivery at 10% of planned caseload in May 2026.	1. Sustain Lapis Lazuli and Türkiye–Iran rail routing; pursue diplomatic facilitation across six transit sovereignties. 2. Rebase cost-per-beneficiary for all nutrition activities to reflect triple transport costs.	Supply Chain, Nutrition	WFP Logistics, UNHCR, IOM	WFP Afghanistan Country Brief, May 2026 (doc_id: 4212240); WFP Afghanistan Country Brief, June 2026 (doc_id: 4215709)	High
Strategic	Returnee surge ahead of 1 September 2026 PoR-holder deadline	~25,000+ returns/week already elevated; WFP returnee cash assistance suspended since June 2026; Islam Qala and Zaranj corridors also at risk from Iran hostilities.	1. Immediate WFP Pakistan–WFP Afghanistan coordination ahead of deadline. 2. Pre-position contingency stocks at Islam Qala and Zaranj before surge materialises.	Emergency Response, Cross-Border Coordination	UNHCR, IOM joint monitoring mechanism	UNHCR-IOM Flash Update #104 (doc_id: 4223873); WFP Afghanistan Country Brief, June 2026 (doc_id: 4215709)	High
Operational	Fuel price shock eroding logistics and transfer value	Diesel at AFN 76.5/litre (Week 3 July 2026): +19% YoY, +21% above three-year average. Basket at AFN 6,056 (4.4% above Oct 2025 TV of AFN 5,800); Nuristan +13%, Faryab +12% provincial spikes.	1. Activate consecutive-week threshold tracking now; model revised transfer value scenarios against ≥10% and ≥20% triggers. 2. Reforecast logistics budgets for Nuristan and Faryab immediately.	VAM, Logistics, Programme	WFP VAM Unit	Afghanistan Weekly Market Report Issue 304 (doc_id: 4222882); Issue 305 (doc_id: 4223777)	High
Operational	CBT modality failure from household purchasing power collapse	Full-time labourer affords 48% of WFP basket nationally; Nuristan at 17%. Labour at 1.9 days/week (−17% YoY). CBT is structurally ineffective in Nuristan, Daykundi, Ghor, and Nimroz.	1. Urgently disaggregate modality decisions by province; switch Nuristan, Daykundi, Ghor, Nimroz to in-kind. 2. Model enhanced transfer values where basket affordability is below 50%.	Programme, VAM	Country Office	Afghanistan Monthly Market Report Issue 73, June 2026 (doc_id: 4220607)	High
Strategic	Worst-case scenario: Pakistan closure + Iran conflict adding 2.3M food-insecure	Scenario S4 projects IPC 3+ rising to 16.1M at six months (2,000 Monte Carlo simulations). El Niño degrading vegetation in northwest/north compounds agricultural outlook.	1. Use S4 modelling as basis for contingency donor appeals. 2. Pre-position stocks for additional 2.3M caseload before scenario materialises. 3. Monitor El Niño precipitation anomalies in Central Asia for trade and population flow impacts.	Emergency Preparedness, Resource Mobilisation	FEWS NET, WFP VAM	Food security under pressure (doc_id: 4218118); FEWS NET Seasonal Monitor (doc_id: 4218021)	High
Fiduciary	Reputational/Compliance — SIGAR allegations and reduced monitoring coverage	As of July 2025, SIGAR-25-29-LL alleged WFP staff corruption and bid-rigging. ACR 2025 confirms shift to risk-based monitoring with reduced field coverage, increasing fraud exposure during partner rationalisation and CBT scale-up.	1. Maintain enhanced spot-check frequency for all incoming local NGO/WLO partners in first six months. 2. Extend biometric verification to all CBT delivery points managed by new partners.	Compliance, Internal Audit, Programme	OIOS, WFP Inspector General	SIGAR-25-29-LL (July 2025); ACR 2025 (acr://2025)	High
Operational	Cascading flood shocks destroying agricultural land and disrupting supply routes	Eastern floods (20–21 July) damaged Laghman crops; central floods (23 July) displaced hundreds of families across six provinces; Torkham disrupted; crop loss figures for Paktika, Paktia, Ghazni, Khost pending joint assessments.	1. Commission joint assessments to quantify crop losses in Laghman and eastern flood areas as an intelligence priority. 2. Assess whether Torkham flooding is diverting returnee flows to crossings requiring pre-positioned stocks.	Emergency Response, VAM	OCHA FSAC, WHO	Flash Update #3 (doc_id: 4223493); WHO SitRep No. 2 (doc_id: 4223272)	Medium

Note: More than 165 documents were reviewed covering April–July 2026. The intelligence is current as of 3 August 2026.

Discrepancies & Data Integrity:

• HNRP funding received is cited as USD 241 million in the OCHA HNRP Response Overview (data as of June 2026, doc_id: 4217231) and USD 239 million in the UNICEF Mid-Year SitRep (doc_id: 4223776, published July 2026); the minor discrepancy likely reflects different cut-off dates — the July 2026 UNICEF figure (USD 239 million) is adopted as more recent, and both are labelled as all-partners HNRP figures distinct from WFP's own NFR.

Footnotes

1. WFP Afghanistan Country Brief, July 2026 — WFP, July 2026 (doc_id: 4221542)
2. WFP Afghanistan Country Brief, June 2026 — WFP, June 2026 (doc_id: 4215709)
3. Afghanistan Weekly Market Report Issue 304–305 — WFP, July 2026 (doc_id: 4222882; doc_id: 4223777)
4. Crisis Group — Hormuz Closure, July 2026 (ref://5)
5. The Diplomat — US Foreign Assistance Termination, Afghanistan (ref://2)
6. SIGAR-25-29-LL — SIGAR, July 2025
7. UNHCR-IOM Pakistan Flash Update #104, 15 Sep 2023–25 Jul 2026 — IOM/UNHCR, July 2026 (doc_id: 4223873)
8. WHO Situation Report No. 2: Flash Floods in Eastern Afghanistan — WHO, July 2026 (doc_id: 4223272); Afghanistan Flash Update #3 — OCHA, July 2026 (doc_id: 4223493)
9. UNICEF Afghanistan Humanitarian Situation Report No. 6 (Mid-Year), 30 June 2026 — UNICEF, July 2026 (doc_id: 4223776)
10. Afghanistan Monthly Market Report Issue 73, June 2026 — WFP, July 2026 (doc_id: 4220607)
11. Food security under pressure: Impacts of the Middle East Crisis and Pakistan Conflict on Afghanistan — WFP, June 2026 (doc_id: 4218118)
12. Afghanistan Seasonal Monitor — FEWS NET, June 2026 (doc_id: 4218021)
13. ACLED conflict data, Afghanistan, July 2026 — ACLED via HDX, August 2026
14. WFP Afghanistan Annual Country Report 2025 — WFP, 2026 (acr://2025)
15. WFP Afghanistan Country Brief, April 2026 — WFP, April 2026 (doc_id: 4207835)
16. WFP Afghanistan CSP 2018–2027 (Budget Revision, current) — WFP, December 2025 (csp://2018-2027)