Pakistan Country Risk Update

Key Stats – Pakistan 2026

Net Funding Requirements (NFRs):	USD 15M (6-month NFR as of Jan 2026); CSP gap ~USD 243M against USD 787M total requirement (2023–2027)
Current Reach:	366,000 women and children (BNP, Jan 2026); 13,800 CMAM beneficiaries (Sindh/Balochistan, Jan 2026)
Population IPC 3+:	10.55M in IPC Phase 3+ (20% of 53.4M analysed population, Mar 2026) — UP 40% vs Dec 2025 in absolute terms

Executive Summary

Operational Context:

Pakistan faces a compounding cost shock: the basic food basket reached PKR 15,758/month (USD 57) on 21 May 2026 — 4% above the 26 February pre-conflict baseline — following four consecutive weeks of increase from a low of PKR 14,304 on 23 April.[1] Headline CPI surged to 10.9% YoY in April 2026 (up from 7.3% in March); food inflation running at 7.6% YoY. Transport accounted for 30% of the April CPI YoY contribution.[2]
Fuel prices are the primary operational cost driver: diesel at PKR 380.2/litre (+47% YoY) and Super Petrol at PKR 393.4/litre (+54.5% YoY) as of April 2026, inflating all trucking and last-mile delivery costs.[2] HDX price data (April 2026) shows diesel at PKR 410/litre, +27% month-on-month — the steepest single-commodity price move in the basket. Balochistan and KP are most exposed given long inter-provincial supply chains. All operational cost projections require immediate recalibration; an NFR or budget revision request may be warranted if projections have not been updated since mid-2025.[2]
The Afghanistan–Pakistan border has been closed since 12 October 2025, blocking ~8,800 mt of food commodities and disrupting inflows of agricultural produce, spices, cotton, and coal into KP and Balochistan. Torkham crossing is additionally contaminated with UXOs.[3] Approximately 800 containers at Karachi require diplomatic engagement to operationalise a reported humanitarian corridor.[4]
The Strait of Hormuz blockade (active since late February 2026) is transmitting into domestic fuel and DAP fertiliser import costs. A fragile US–Iran memorandum of understanding is being negotiated as of late May 2026 but remains unsigned, with a 60-day window for a final deal leaving supply chain uncertainty for at least two more months.[5]
Security is deteriorating: ACLED records 1,177 conflict events and 678 fatalities in May 2026 — up 14% (events) and 49% (fatalities) month-on-month. Political violence accounts for 323 events and 581 fatalities; civilian targeting for 141 events and 97 fatalities. A BLA suicide bombing on a military train in Quetta underscores the KP/Balochistan security risk to WFP field operations.[6]
India–Pakistan bilateral relations have structurally deteriorated following 2025 armed conflict: zero bilateral communication, India's suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty creating downstream stress on South Punjab livestock and grazing lands, and a 15km border demolition zone along the full frontier.[7] Rawalpindi's three principal public hospitals face a confirmed healthcare financing collapse, with medicine stockouts disproportionately affecting malnourished populations.[8]

Vulnerability Scale:

IPC March 2026 analysis (covering 53.4M people) places 10.55M in Phase 3+ (Crisis or worse), including 1.39M in Phase 4 (Emergency) — a 40% increase in Phase 3+ from December 2025 (7.54M). Note: the analysed population increased significantly between analyses (35.6M → 53.4M), making percentage comparisons more reliable than absolutes.[9]
As of June 2025 (ACAPS), approximately 17 million people faced IPC Phase 3+ acute food insecurity nationally, with 6 million at Phase 4, concentrated in KP and Balochistan where conflict directly constrains humanitarian access.[10] Structural malnutrition remains severe: 40% stunting in children 6–59 months; GAM 10.1–16.6% by KP district per 2023 SMART surveys.[11]
Wheat flour at PKR 121/kg as of 21 May 2026, up 6% from PKR 114/kg on 26 February; food inflation at 7.6% YoY is directly eroding purchasing power for poor households. HDX market data (April 2026) shows food staple prices broadly stable month-on-month, but the fuel spike (+27% diesel m-o-m) is the operative pass-through risk into food prices over the next 30–60 days.[1][2]
Cross-border displacement into Pakistan from Afghanistan remains an unquantified critical intelligence gap: 100,000+ people displaced in Afghan border provinces since October 2025; active assisted returnee flows from Pakistan to Afghanistan confirmed 17–23 May 2026, but no IDP/refugee inflow figures into Pakistan are confirmed in available sources.[12]

Trend Indicators:

Worsening — accelerating. Basic food basket has risen for four consecutive weeks; CPI MoM acceleration (2.5% in April vs 1.2% in March) signals systemic rather than shock-driven inflation. The Afghanistan border closure is now seven months old with no reopening signal, sustaining supply-side pressure in KP and Balochistan.[1][2]
Positive agricultural buffer: as of September 2025 (FEWS NET), wheat availability exceeded national consumption requirements by ~4 million MT, significantly reducing risk of a national food price crisis analogous to 2022/23. However, IMF programme conditionality prevents untargeted subsidies, limiting government buffer tools.[11]
The Benazir Nashonuma Programme (BNP) — WFP's anchor programme — has now reached 4.6 million mothers and children since 2020, achieving a reported 22% reduction in stunting at 6 months among beneficiaries.[13] This is a positive trend signal but does not yet move national stunting rates.
The National Anticipatory Action Strategy launched in April 2026, leaving a narrow window before the June 2026 monsoon season. Province-level protocol operationalisation status is not confirmed in current sources — an immediate operational risk if WFP is forced into reactive rather than anticipatory response for the third consecutive year.[14]

WFP Operations:

As of January 2026 (per WFP Country Brief February 2026): 366,000 women and children receiving specialised nutritious food across 556 BNP centres in 157 districts; 13,800 CMAM beneficiaries in Sindh and Balochistan; school meals reaching 20,600 children in Quetta with conditional cash to 9,800 parents; 2025 monsoon flood response still active with 375,000 people assisted (100,000 in January).[14] These figures are five months old; no more recent WFP reach data is available in the current substrate.
133 WFP-supported assets confirmed at 100% Asset Detection Indicator (ADI) score via satellite monitoring (AIMS, March 2026) — full portfolio visibility and a strong accountability foundation for donor reporting.[15]
As of September 2024 (WFP Internal Audit AR/24/09): the community feedback mechanism was effectively non-functional — only 248 calls received across three provinces in 2023 from a programme serving 1.3 million beneficiaries, with outdated hotline numbers still displayed. Face-to-face mechanisms recommended since 2022 had not been implemented. This finding remains operationally live given ongoing BNP operations.[16]
As of September 2024 (Internal Audit): LNS procurement from a single local supplier using superseded pre-July 2023 corporate specifications without a formalised waiver. Whether a waiver has since been formalised or supplier diversification initiated is not confirmed in current sources.[16]
CBT transfer value adequacy is an implicit but unquantified risk: no current transfer value data exists in the substrate against the 4% food basket increase since February 2026.[1]

Funding Outlook:

As of January 2026 (per WFP Country Brief February 2026): six-month NFR stands at USD 15M; total CSP (2023–2027) gap approximately USD 242.95M against USD 787.3M required. Near-term pipeline appears manageable; medium-term resource base is materially constrained.[14]
Previously (2024 ACR): SO1 reached 81% beneficiary achievement at 66% expenditure; SO2 reached 257% beneficiary achievement at 127% expenditure (driven by multi-year BNP contributions booked in mid-2024, not fully spent); SO4 reached 135% beneficiary achievement at 90% expenditure. CSP was 28% underfunded against the needs-based plan.[17] The BNP two-year extension agreement (USD 193M) creates a non-activity-specific balance of USD 160M — a positive liquidity signal but one that masks structural underfunding of Activity 1 (only 15% of needs met in 2024).
US contributions (via PRM and USDA) are confirmed in the donor base; no disaggregated US share of the USD 535M–544M allocated contributions is available. Shifting US foreign assistance posture represents a material concentration risk that has not been formally stress-tested at the country level.[14]
Norway confirmed a 30 million NOK (~USD 2.8–3M) bilateral contribution to Pakistan flood response, channelled primarily through OCHA ERF, UNICEF, and IFRC — not directly to WFP.[18]

In The News

How far have the US and Iran got towards ending the Iran war (Dawn, Pakistan): A fragile US–Iran MOU is being negotiated that would reopen the Strait of Hormuz, but unresolved issues (nuclear programme, Lebanon, sanctions sequencing) mean supply chain disruption may persist for weeks to months — directly sustaining fuel price pressure on WFP Pakistan trucking and DAP fertiliser imports.[5]
Iran says new US strikes violated ceasefire (Rappler): US strikes in Hormozgan province on 25–26 May have fractured the fragile ceasefire; Hormuz vessel traffic reduced to ~25% of normal capacity with Brent crude at $98.91/barrel. Doha talks remain stalled on release of ~$24bn in frozen Iranian funds — no near-term resolution visible.[19]

Potential Risks

Category	Title	Description	Potential Mitigations	Functional Areas	Support Resources	Evidence	Seriousness
Financial	CSP/Programme Budget Adequacy Gap	HSD +47% YoY, food inflation +7.6% YoY, and basic food basket 4% above pre-conflict baseline create material adequacy gap in existing cost projections. CBT transfer values unreviewed.	1. Immediately recalibrate all operational cost projections against sustained fuel shock (+47–55% above baseline). 2. Assess NFR or budget revision request if projections not updated since mid-2025. 3. Urgently review CBT transfer values against 4% food basket increase.	Finance, Programme, VAM	RBO Finance, HQ Budget	WFP Pakistan Weekly Market Report 21 May 2026 (doc_id: 4213727); Pakistan Market Monitor April 2026 (doc_id: 4213018)	High
Operational	Fuel Cost Shock — Trucking & Last-Mile	Diesel +47% YoY (PKR 380.2/L); +27% m-o-m per HDX April data. Balochistan and KP most exposed via long supply chains. Strait of Hormuz disruption sustains upward pressure.	1. Revise all trucking and field mission budget line items immediately. 2. Explore UAE–Oman Green Corridor (Dubai Customs Notices 04/2026, 06/2026) for nutrition/medical supply routing — no Oman MoH approval required for origin-to-destination consignments.	Logistics, Supply Chain, Finance	Logistics Cluster, UNHRD	Pakistan Market Monitor April 2026 (doc_id: 4213018); Supply Routes Snapshot 25 May 2026 (doc_id: 4213574)	High
Operational	Afghanistan–Pakistan Border Closure Disrupting Supply	Border closed since 12 Oct 2025; ~8,800 mt of food commodities blocked; Torkham crossing UXO-contaminated; ~800 containers at Karachi require diplomatic engagement to operationalise humanitarian corridor.	1. Engage Pakistan authorities via Logistics Cluster (OCHA/WFP co-leadership) on Karachi container clearance. 2. Assess western (Iran) and northern (Central Asia) corridor compensatory capacity. 3. Activate bilateral WFP PAK–WFP AFG coordination on supply chain integrity.	Logistics, External Relations	Logistics Cluster, UNHCR, IOM	IFRC DREF MDRAF021 (doc_id: 4213432); Pakistan Market Monitor April 2026 (doc_id: 4213018)	High
Strategic	Unquantified Cross-Border Displacement Inflows	100,000+ displaced in Afghan border provinces since Oct 2025; returnee flows from Pakistan to Afghanistan confirmed 17–23 May 2026. No IDP/refugee inflow figures into Pakistan confirmed — a critical intelligence gap.	1. Coordinate with UNHCR/IOM to confirm whether cross-border refugee movements into Pakistan are occurring. 2. Activate joint needs assessment at border crossing points in KP and Balochistan.	VAM, Programme, External Relations	UNHCR, IOM, FAO	OCHA Afghanistan Humanitarian Update Mar–Apr 2026 (doc_id: 4213393); UNHCR Returnees Report 17–23 May 2026 (doc_id: 4213392)	High
Strategic	US Donor Concentration Risk	US (PRM + USDA) confirmed in donor base; no disaggregated share of USD 535–544M allocated contributions available. Shifting US foreign assistance posture is material; no country-level stress test documented.	1. Disaggregate US share of allocated contributions and model 25%/50%/100% reduction scenarios. 2. Accelerate engagement with EU ECHO, FCDO, and Gulf donors to diversify pipeline ahead of 2027 CSP end.	Resource Mobilisation, Finance	RBO, HQ Donors	WFP PAK Country Brief Jan 2026 (pub: Feb 2026); 2024 ACR (doc_id: internal)	High
Fiduciary	Community Feedback Mechanism Non-Functional	As of Sep 2024 (Internal Audit AR/24/09): only 248 calls received across 3 provinces from 1.3M BNP beneficiaries; outdated hotlines displayed; face-to-face mechanisms not implemented 2+ years after recommendation.	1. Deploy face-to-face feedback at BNP facilitation centres immediately. 2. Replace outdated hotline signage. 3. Integrate BISP parallel feedback data into WFP CFM. Confirm remediation status to RBO.	Accountability, Protection, Programme	Internal Audit, RBO Oversight	WFP Internal Audit AR/24/09, Sep 2024 (doc_id: internal)	High
Operational	2026 Monsoon Anticipatory Action — Operationalisation Gap	National AA Strategy launched April 2026; monsoon onset June 2026. Province-level protocol status unconfirmed. Pakistan experienced three consecutive years of reactive flood response; 2025 floods affected 7–8M people.	1. Confirm province-level AA protocol activation status (trigger thresholds, pre-positioning plans, partner activation) by end of May 2026. 2. Pre-position stocks in Sindh and KP sub-offices ahead of June onset.	Emergency, Logistics, Programme	NDMA, PDMAs, RBO Emergency	WFP PAK Country Brief Jan 2026 (pub: Feb 2026); OCHA PAK Monsoon Floods SitUpdate Sep 2025	Medium
Operational	Security Deterioration — KP and Balochistan	May 2026 ACLED: 1,177 events (+14% m-o-m), 678 fatalities (+49% m-o-m); BLA attack on military train in Quetta; civilian targeting at 141 events/97 fatalities. Active conflict constrains access in provinces with highest food insecurity.	1. Verify MOSS compliance and update security risk assessments for Quetta, Nushki, Buner, and Shangla operations. 2. Ensure cooperating partner capacity assessment covers alternate last-mile delivery routes in KP districts.	Security, Logistics, Programme	UNDSS, Logistics Cluster	ACLED via HDX May 2026; ACAPS Key Crises 2025 (doc_id: internal)	Medium

Note: More than 153 documents were reviewed covering the period November 2024 – May 2026. The intelligence is current as of 21 May 2026 (market data) and 26 May 2026 (regional logistics/displacement).

Discrepancies & Data Integrity:

HDX WFP VAM food price data (April 2026) shows wheat flour at PKR 110/kg and diesel at PKR 410/litre, while the WFP Pakistan Weekly Market Report (21 May 2026, doc_id: 4213727) shows wheat flour at PKR 121/kg and the Pakistan Market Monitor (April 2026, doc_id: 4213018) shows diesel at PKR 380.2/litre; the HDX data carries a 15 April as-of date and the market reports reflect later field collection — the Weekly Market Report is treated as authoritative for current conditions per lane authority rules, and the HDX diesel figure (+27% m-o-m) is cited only for its directional signal.

Footnotes

WFP Pakistan — Weekly Market Report (21 May 2026) — World Food Programme, May 2026 (doc_id: 4213727)
Pakistan — Market Monitor Report — April 2026 — World Food Programme, May 2026 (doc_id: 4213018)
Afghanistan Flood 2026 — DREF Operation Update (MDRAF021) — IFRC, May 2026 (doc_id: 4213432)
Supply Routes Snapshot, 25 May 2026: Regional Middle East Crisis — Logistics Cluster/WFP, May 2026 (doc_id: 4213574)
"How far have the US and Iran got towards ending the Iran war" — Dawn (Pakistan), 29 May 2026
ACLED conflict data via HDX — May 2026; BBC Asia — BLA Quetta attack report
News Intelligence — India–Pakistan bilateral deterioration, May 2026
News Intelligence — Rawalpindi hospital financing collapse, June 2026
IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis Pakistan — March 2026 (via HDX)
ACAPS — Pakistan Key Crises to Watch in 2025 — ACAPS, June 2025
FEWS NET — Pakistan Targeted Analysis — FEWS NET, September 2025
Afghanistan: Humanitarian Update, March and April 2026 — OCHA, May 2026 (doc_id: 4213393); Afghanistan: Assisted Afghan Returnees 17–23 May 2026 — UNHCR, May 2026 (doc_id: 4213392)
WFP Stories — Benazir Nashonuma Programme — WFP, 25 May 2026
WFP Pakistan Country Brief — January 2026 operations — World Food Programme, February 2026
Pakistan: Asset Impact Monitoring from Space (AIMS) Report — WFP, March 2026 (doc_id: 4211779)
WFP Pakistan — Internal Audit AR/24/09 — WFP Office of Internal Audit, September 2024
WFP Pakistan — Annual Country Report 2024 — World Food Programme, 2024 (ACR report_year: 2024)
News Intelligence — Norway 30M NOK Pakistan flood contribution, May 2026
"Iran says new US strikes violated ceasefire" — Rappler, 26 May 2026

Pakistan Country Risk Update – 2026

Key Stats – Pakistan 2026

Executive Summary

In The News

Potential Risks