Sudan Country Risk Update – 2026

Key Stats – Sudan 2026

Net Funding Requirements (NFRs):	USD 460M minimum pipeline floor unmet; pipeline depletion by July 2026
Current Reach:	12.1M people reached in 2025 (per ACR 2025); current 2026 monthly reach not yet confirmed in available sources
Population IPC 3+:	19.5–21M in acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3+) as of April 2026; IPC Phase 5 famine confirmed in Al Fasher and Kadugli

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Executive Summary

Operational Context:

• Sudan's conflict, now in its fourth year, has produced one of the world's most acute food crises. IPC Phase 5 famine is confirmed in Al Fasher (North Darfur) and Kadugli (South Kordofan/Nuba Mountains).^[1] RSF ethnic cleansing operations in El Fasher — documented by Amnesty International across 247 witness interviews — and the SAF's Kordofan siege posture are generating compounding displacement and access denial.^[2]
• El Obeid (North Kordofan) is the most urgent emerging access crisis. Multiple sources confirm RSF drone strikes are systematically destroying civilian infrastructure — power, fuel, hospitals, markets — in a city of approximately 600,000 including ~100,000 IDPs, with all humanitarian access severed for two months. El Obeid is the critical logistics hub connecting Khartoum, Darfur, and all three Kordofan states. A UN Human Rights Council draft resolution explicitly names WFP truck attacks in the Kordofan corridor as part of a documented pattern of obstruction.^[3] An RSF assault on El Obeid would sever WFP's central Sudan supply chain and replicate the El Fasher access collapse pattern.
• A UAE-facilitated RSF logistics network operating through eastern Libya, and separately, visual confirmation of an Ethiopian logistics node supporting RSF in Blue Nile, represent material escalations in the external conflict architecture sustaining the war.^[4]
• Under the 2019–2026 CSP, WFP planned a humanitarian-development-peace nexus approach with SO5 (policy reform and institutional development) suspended entirely throughout 2025 due to political incompatibility. The CSP's resilience and national-systems ambitions remain aspirational given active famine conditions.

Vulnerability Scale:

• As of April 2026, 19.5–21 million people face acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3+), with 134,808 confirmed in IPC Phase 5 and 5 million+ in IPC Phase 4 per the January 2026 IPC analysis (⚠ six months old — situation has likely deteriorated).^[5] The FSL Cluster advocacy note cites 28.9 million facing acute food insecurity with 10.2 million at IPC Phase 4–5 — a more recent and likely more accurate figure reflecting continued deterioration.^[6]
• A 65% surge in newly displaced persons across Kordofan since February 2026, with 219,319 IDPs confirmed in the Kordofan region as of 30 June 2026 (food security screening not yet completed).^[7]
• Agricultural production is severely disrupted: FAO CFSAM (March 2026) estimates 2025 sorghum production ~10% below the five-year average and millet ~46% below average. Al Jazirah state — historically 50% of Sudan's wheat production — has suffered total agricultural disruption. Fewer than 20% of agrifood MSMEs operate at capacity.^[8]
• Severe rainfall deficits persist: 47 of 171 districts show three-month rainfall below 75% of normal, with Sirba (South Darfur) at 49% of normal. NDVI-confirmed agricultural stress in six districts reinforces the production deficit picture.^[9]
• Active bidirectional displacement: South Sudanese influx into Sudan confirmed 30 June 2026; new Sudanese arrivals into Egypt confirmed 2 July 2026 — both caseloads entering IPC Phase 4–5 absorption areas without supplementary funding.^[10]

Trend Indicators:

• ACLED data shows June 2026 conflict events at 235 (down 32% month-on-month from 348 in May) and fatalities at 547 (down 47% from 1,028). This reduction is likely tactical repositioning ahead of the El Obeid assault rather than genuine de-escalation — the 12-month average is 331 events/month and 1,112 fatalities/month.
• The WFP Local Food Basket cost reached SDG 2,762/unit in May 2026 (+14% month-on-month, +49% year-on-year), driven by SDG depreciation (parallel market: SDG 4,150/USD, -60% year-on-year; commercial banks: SDG 3,390/USD, -66% year-on-year). Sorghum +18% year-on-year; vegetable oil +39% year-on-year; faba beans +12% year-on-year.^[11] Casual wage growth at 3.7% month-on-month is structurally outpaced, rendering CBT transfer values materially under-resourced.
• El Niño forming with peak impacts expected October 2026–March 2027; a joint WFP-FAO USD 202M anticipatory action appeal covers 22 high-risk nations including Sudan-adjacent states — an early-action planning window is open now.^[12]

WFP Operations:

• Previously (per ACR 2025): WFP reached 12.1 million people (annual), doubling average monthly reach to 4 million. Delivered 324,000 mt of food and USD 153.7M in CBT. SO1 achieved 117.8% beneficiary achievement rate at 97.9% expenditure rate against implementation plan — but transfer volumes were 300,000 mt against 1.1 million mt planned (27%) due to access disruption and ration reductions. SO2 reached 57.1% beneficiary achievement at 61.4% expenditure rate, with school feeding receiving 78% of SO2 resources. SO4 achieved at 87.6% expenditure rate; ETC relied entirely on 2024 carry-over with no new 2025 donor contributions secured.^[13]
• IPC Phase 5 areas are currently receiving 70% rations; IPC Phase 4 areas receiving 50% rations. Without the USD 460M pipeline floor being met by July 2026, both ration sizes and caseloads will be cut simultaneously.^[14]
• CBT modality is collapsing in active conflict zones where market functionality has failed; in-kind contingency prepositioning is required. No confirmed in-kind stock levels available for named El Obeid or Kordofan facilities in current sources.
• The FSL Cluster (WFP/FAO co-lead) targets 11 million people for emergency agricultural support; current reach is 1 million. The June 2026 planting window is closing — delayed action forfeits the 2026 agricultural season. A USD 1 sorghum seed investment yields USD 29 in local produce (FSL Cluster advocacy note).^[6]
• Cross-border relay telecoms infrastructure through Chad, Egypt, and South Sudan is under active conflict stress; no contract values or service continuity data are recoverable from the June 2026 LTC Dashboard.^[15]

Funding Outlook:

• Sudan CO has historically operated at 30–50% funded against appeals in 2024–2025.^[10] Previously (per ACR 2025): WFP was funded at 86% of annual needs, with USD 678.5M in new contributions; however, 56% of available resources were expended by year-end, with under-spending driven by access constraints and late contribution timing.
• The USD 460M pipeline floor is an immediate action-forcing deadline. Failure to meet it by July 2026 triggers simultaneous ration and caseload cuts in the world's active famine zones.^[14] The UAE has pledged USD 30M for El Obeid through UAE Aid Agency with UN partnership language — a potentially significant bilateral injection, though specifics of WFP's implementing role are unconfirmed.^[16]
• Both Sudan CO and South Sudan CO face chronic underfunding; new bidirectional displacement caseloads will widen gaps without emergency supplementary funding. No formal joint WFP Sudan–WFP South Sudan CO response mechanism is documented.^[10]
• Sudan CO historically 30–50% funded against CSP appeals; the 2019–2026 CSP total cost to WFP was USD 2.27 billion across the full plan window — a figure that underscores the structural mismatch between planning ambition and donor delivery.

In The News

• RSF Siege and Atrocity Risk in El Obeid (Al Jazeera): El Obeid, North Kordofan — WFP's critical logistics hub for central Sudan — faces imminent RSF assault, with humanitarian access severed and drone strikes on civilian infrastructure. Loss of El Obeid would sever the Darfur-eastern Sudan supply corridor and replicate the El Fasher access collapse.^[3]
• WFP Truck Attacks Named in UN Human Rights Council Resolution (news): The UN HRC emergency draft resolution on El Obeid explicitly documents WFP truck attacks as part of a pattern of obstruction in the Kordofan corridor — confirming WFP supply chains face active, targeted threat after 18 months of siege-like conditions.^[3]
• Donor Early Warning Failures in El Fasher (Devex): UK Parliament is formally scrutinising donor inaction on Sudan atrocity warnings despite nearly 70 Yale Humanitarian Research Lab reports; US Food for Peace now managed by 10 staff (down from 300 at USAID). Both signals indicate structural contraction in the donor accountability and funding architecture underpinning Sudan response.^[17]

Potential Risks

Category	Title	Description	Potential Mitigations	Functional Areas	Support Resources	Evidence	Seriousness
Operational	Food pipeline depletion by July 2026 forcing simultaneous ration and caseload cuts	Without emergency contributions meeting the USD 460M floor, IPC Phase 5 areas on 70% rations and IPC Phase 4 areas on 50% rations face simultaneous cuts — risking famine deterioration in Al Fasher and Kadugli	1. Escalate as action-forcing communication to HQ and donors immediately. 2. Preposition in-kind stocks before lean-season access windows close further.	Supply Chain, Programme, Donor Relations	RBN, HQ Resource Mobilisation	WFP Sudan Country Brief, May 2026 (doc_id: 4217639)	High
Operational	El Obeid siege severing central Sudan supply corridor	RSF siege of El Obeid (pop. ~600,000 + 100,000 IDPs) with access severed for 2 months and active drone strikes on logistics infrastructure threatens WFP's Kordofan–Darfur supply chain; UN HRC draft resolution names WFP truck attacks	1. Activate alternative routing assessments immediately via Chad-Adré and Sudan-Egypt corridors. 2. Quantify current pre-positioned stocks in El Obeid and Kordofan facilities; model supply gap under full access denial.	Logistics, Access, Supply Chain	RBN, Logistics Cluster, UNDSS	Al Jazeera (ref://8); UN HRC resolution cited at ref://43; OCHA ERC alarm (doc: ref://19)	High
Financial	CBT transfer value erosion from LFB cost surge	LFB cost at SDG 2,762/unit (+14% month-on-month, +49% year-on-year) against 3.7% month-on-month casual wage growth renders all prior CBT valuations materially under-resourced	1. Trigger immediate CBT transfer value recalibration to May 2026 LFB baseline. 2. Shift LFB monitoring to monthly auto-recalibration trigger given 14% monthly volatility.	VAM, Programme, CBT Operations	RBN, HQ RAM	WFP Sudan Market Monitor, June 2026 (doc_id: 4217107)	High
Strategic	Bidirectional cross-border displacement compounding IPC Phase 4–5 absorption	South Sudanese influx into Sudan (confirmed 30 Jun 2026) and Sudanese outflow to Egypt (confirmed 2 Jul 2026) widening WFP funding gaps; no formal WFP Sudan–South Sudan CO joint mechanism exists	1. Establish formal WFP Sudan CO / South Sudan CO joint response mechanism with ROMENA and RBN alignment. 2. Conduct joint needs assessments at Sudan–Egypt border crossing points to close handover chain gaps between RBB/RBC and RBN/RBJ.	Programme, Partnerships, Donor Relations	RBN, RBJ, ROMENA, UNHCR, IOM	CORE Sudan: Influx from South Sudan, 30 Jun 2026 (doc_id: 4219572); Egypt: New Arrivals from Sudan, 2 Jul 2026 (doc_id: 4219581)	High
Financial	Currency depreciation driving structural operational cost escalation	SDG parallel market rate at SDG 4,150/USD (-60% year-on-year); commercial bank at SDG 3,390/USD (-66% year-on-year); all SDG-denominated procurement costs structurally elevated	1. Model forward cost projections using both exchange rates to bound budget exposure. 2. Review procurement contracts for FX escalation clauses and adjust pipeline cost estimates.	Finance, Supply Chain, Procurement	RBN, HQ Finance	WFP Sudan Market Monitor, June 2026 (doc_id: 4217107)	High
Operational	CBT modality collapse in conflict-affected markets	Market functionality has collapsed in active conflict zones, undermining CBT delivery; no confirmed in-kind contingency stock levels for named Kordofan/El Obeid facilities in current sources	1. Map conflict-zone markets immediately to identify where CBT must be suspended and in-kind substituted. 2. Preposition in-kind stocks in confirmed market-collapse areas before lean-season access windows close.	Programme, Supply Chain, Logistics	RBN, Logistics Cluster	WFP Sudan Monthly Snapshot, May 2026 (doc_id: 4217649)	High
Strategic	Donor accountability contraction and US Food for Peace capacity collapse	US Food for Peace transferred to USDA and now managed by 10 staff (vs. 300 at USAID); UK parliamentary scrutiny of Sudan donor inaction signals political friction but not new funding. Combined effect: structural reduction in US in-kind food pipeline capacity at the moment of peak need	1. Diversify donor base beyond traditional US/UK dependency; engage Gulf bilateral donors (UAE USD 30M El Obeid pledge as entry point). 2. Frame USD 460M pipeline floor as cost-effectiveness argument with documented return-on-investment (FSL Cluster: USD 1 seed → USD 29 produce).	Donor Relations, External Affairs	HQ Partnerships, RBN	Devex (ref://5, ref://10); FSL Cluster Advocacy Note, May 2026	High
Operational	Agricultural season loss from delayed emergency input funding	FSL Cluster (WFP/FAO co-lead) targets 11M people for emergency agricultural support; current reach is 1M. June 2026 planting window is closing. Millet production 46% below five-year average; sorghum 10% below average. Delayed action forfeits the 2026 harvest and drives IPC Phase escalation in H2 2026	1. Prioritise emergency seed/tools funding within FSL Cluster resource mobilisation before planting window closes. 2. Use USD 29 return-per-dollar investment figure in donor communications to justify agricultural over pure food-aid allocation.	Programme, Partnerships, Cluster Coordination	RBN, FAO, FSL Cluster	FSL Cluster Emergency Agricultural Support Advocacy Note, May 2026; Solidarités International Presentation, May 2026	Medium

Note: More than 126 documents were reviewed covering the period through July 2026. Intelligence is current as of 6 July 2026.

Discrepancies & Data Integrity:

• IPC Phase 3+ population figures are inconsistent across sources: the January 2026 IPC analysis (six months old) shows 19.5M in Phase 3+, UNICEF SitRep No. 42 (April 2026) cites 19.5–21M, and the FSL Cluster Advocacy Note (May 2026) cites 28.9M with 10.2M at Phase 4–5; the FSL figure is adopted as the most recent and likely most reflective of current deterioration, but methodological comparability across these estimates is unconfirmed — the January IPC analysis analysed 47.5M people as its denominator, while the FSL figure's denominator is not specified in available extracts.

Footnotes

1. UNICEF Sudan Humanitarian Situation Report No. 42, 30 April 2026 — UNICEF, April 2026 (doc_id: 4218932)
2. Amnesty International / SCMP coverage of El Fasher crimes against humanity — SCMP Asia (ref://4)
3. Al Jazeera: El Obeid siege and UN Human Rights Council draft resolution citing WFP truck attacks — Al Jazeera (ref://8); news (ref://43); OCHA ERC alarm, 30 June 2026 (ref://19)
4. News: UAE-Libya RSF logistics network (ref://51); Ethiopian Blue Nile logistics node (ref://52)
5. IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis, January 2026 (period: February–May 2026) — IPC, January 2026
6. FSL Cluster: Emergency Agricultural Support in Sudan (2026–2028) Advocacy Note — FAO/WFP FSL Cluster, May 2026 (https://fscluster.org/sudan/document/emergency-agricultural-support-sudan)
7. DTM Sudan Focused Flash Alert: Kordofan Region (Update 06) — IOM, 30 June 2026 (doc_id: 4218654)
8. Solidarités International: Agriculture — Bridge from Emergency to Resilience — FSL Cluster, May 2026 (https://fscluster.org/sudan/document/agriculture-bridge-emergency-resilience); FAO CFSAM, March 2026 cited therein
9. WFP-VAM rainfall and NDVI anomaly data, dekad to 21 June 2026
10. CORE Sudan: Influx from South Sudan — UNHCR, 30 June 2026 (doc_id: 4219572); CORE Sudan Situation: Sudanese return from neighbouring countries — UNHCR, 30 June 2026 (doc_id: 4219571); Egypt: New Arrivals from Sudan — UNHCR, 2 July 2026 (doc_id: 4219581)
11. WFP Sudan Market Monitor — WFP/Logistics Cluster, June 2026 (doc_id: 4217107)
12. The New Humanitarian: El Niño anticipatory action appeal — The New Humanitarian, 2 July 2026 (ref://3)
13. WFP Sudan Annual Country Report (ACR) 2025 — WFP, 2025
14. WFP Sudan Country Brief — WFP, May 2026 (doc_id: 4217639)
15. Sudan: LTC Telecoms Services Dashboard — WFP/ETC/Logistics Cluster, June 2026 (doc_id: 4219597)
16. News: UAE USD 30M emergency allocation for El Obeid — (ref://34, ref://37)
17. Devex: Donor early warning failures in El Fasher; US Food for Peace capacity collapse — Devex, 30 June 2026 (ref://5); Devex, 2 July 2026 (ref://10)