Sudan Country Risk Update – 2026

Key Stats – Sudan 2026

Net Funding Requirements (NFRs):	USD 645.6M (Jun–Nov 2026); minimum floor USD 460M; pipeline depleted July 2026
Current Reach:	680,000 of 771,000 people (88%) in famine-risk areas reached in May 2026
Population IPC 3+:	19.5M people (41% of population) in IPC Phase 3+ as of May 2026 IPC Special Snapshot; lean season (Jun–Sep 2026) projected to worsen

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Executive Summary

Operational Context:

• Sudan's conflict, now in its fourth year, has produced active famine in Al Fasher (North Darfur) and Kadugli (South Kordofan/Nuba Mountains), with 14 additional areas across Darfur and Kordofan at significant famine risk.^[1] RSF encirclement of El Obeid — capital of North Kordofan and a critical WFP logistics hub serving central Sudan — is accelerating, with 27 confirmed drone strikes in June 2026 alone targeting power, fuel, and water infrastructure and approximately 500,000 civilians at acute risk.^[2,3] A UN fact-finding mission has formally identified genocide markers in El Fasher, and the pattern of infrastructure destruction in El Obeid mirrors pre-siege El Fasher dynamics.^[3]
• Humanitarian access is systematically obstructed by both SAF and RSF, including a documented June 2025 convoy attack near Al Koma that killed five Sudanese contractors attempting to reach El Fasher.^[4] Sudan's government has conditioned any access improvements on prior RSF military withdrawal — a sequencing the RSF has shown no sign of accepting — leaving access negotiations in a diplomatic holding pattern.^[5]
• A cholera outbreak is spreading across conflict-affected Darfur and Kordofan states with a 13.7% case fatality rate — well above the 1% emergency threshold — signalling near-collapse of treatment capacity precisely as the rainy season begins.^[6] WASH cluster chlorine stocks are stranded in Dubai, compounding the disease response gap.^[7]
• El Obeid's population has swelled to an estimated three million — six times its pre-conflict size — driven by IDP influx, making it simultaneously a critical logistics node and an acute vulnerability concentration point.^[8]

Vulnerability Scale:

• As of the IPC Special Snapshot (14 May 2026), 19.5 million people — 41% of Sudan's population — are in IPC Phase 3+, with over 5 million at IPC Phase 5.^[1] The lean season (June–September 2026) is projected to drive further deterioration across Darfur and Kordofan.
• In Kordofan, 141,134 IDPs across 127 sites report food as the top priority need at 93% of West Kordofan sites, 85% of South Kordofan sites, and 84% of North Kordofan sites.^[9] Women-headed households face food insecurity at three times the rate of male-headed households, and women account for 85% of rainfed agriculture in Darfur and Kordofan.^[10]
• Agricultural systems are in structural collapse: millet production in 2025 was approximately 46% below the five-year average and sorghum approximately 10% below average. Fertilizer prices surged over 67% year-on-year by May 2026, partly driven by Strait of Hormuz disruptions, and 20L of fuel now costs SDG 200,000 — more than double the 2025 price — making input access effectively exclusionary for smallholders.^[11,12]
• Over 4 million people have returned to conflict-affected areas including contaminated zones in Khartoum, Aj Jazirah, and Sennar, with humanitarian service coverage for returnees not quantified in available reporting.^[7]

Trend Indicators:

• ACLED records a sharp statistical drop to 30 conflict events and 60 fatalities in July 2026 to date, against a seven-month average of 294 events and 984 fatalities per month. This almost certainly reflects reporting lag rather than genuine de-escalation, and should not be read as improvement given concurrent siege dynamics in El Obeid and confirmed famine conditions.^[13]
• The WFP Local Food Basket cost reached SDG 2,762/unit in May 2026 — up 14% month-on-month and 49% year-on-year — while the parallel market exchange rate stands at SDG 4,150/USD (-60% year-on-year). Casual wages rose only 3.7% month-on-month, sharply compressing purchasing power for CBT beneficiaries.^[14] Separately, sorghum prices rose 22% and millet 17% month-on-month as of April 2026 HDX data, corroborating the food basket trajectory.
• Severe rainfall deficits persist: 81 of 171 districts recorded three-month rainfall below 75% of seasonal normal, with NDVI vegetation stress confirmed in 11 districts across North Darfur, South Darfur, and Kassala. This will compound harvest shortfalls into late 2026 and deepen food insecurity through 2027.^[15]
• The Farchana (Chad)–West Kordofan nutrition corridor resumed with a 40 mt dispatch in May 2026 after nine-plus months of disruption — a fragile but critical turning point that requires sustained Chad-side logistics support to protect future pipeline into West Kordofan.^[1]

WFP Operations:

• In May 2026, WFP reached 680,000 of 771,000 people (88%) in famine-risk areas, including 39,000 in El Fasher, 391,000 in Tawila, 147,000 in Beliel, 36,000 in Kadugli, 15,000 in Dilling, and 30,000 in Um Durein — with approximately 91,000 people in famine-risk areas not reached.^[1] IPC5 areas are currently receiving 70% rations; IPC4 areas 50% rations. Pipeline depletion in July 2026 will force simultaneous ration and caseload cuts, risking famine deterioration.
• CBT transfer values are materially under-resourced against the May 2026 LFB cost of SDG 2,762/unit; an immediate recalibration is required. The White Nile State emergency CBT scale-up reached 391,000 people (339,000 via CBT rollout) in May 2026, demonstrating a functioning transfer mechanism that is contingent on correct calibration.^[1,14] The Bankak mobile transfer system — the sole functioning financial instrument in RSF-held areas — carries cash-conversion fees of up to 20%, further eroding real transfer value.^[12]
• The LTC Telecoms 2026 requirement of USD 5.5 million is 100% unfunded as of June 2026, directly threatening communications for approximately 1,700 humanitarian responders across 67 sites in 7 hubs, including beneficiary safety reporting and supply chain coordination.^[16]
• Previously (2025 ACR): WFP reached 12.1 million people (up from 7.9 million in 2024), with SO1 achieving 117.8% beneficiary achievement rate at 97.9% expenditure rate against a severely constrained funding base. SO2 reached 57.1% beneficiary achievement at 61.4% expenditure rate, with inconsistent funding timing and delayed SNF clearances as primary constraints. SO4 ETC activity relied entirely on 2024 carry-over; no new donor contributions were secured in 2025 — the same structural gap that now produces the 100% unfunded 2026 telecoms requirement.^[17]
• Under the 2019–2026 CSP, WFP's strategic intent spans crisis response (SO1), nutrition (SO2), resilience building including productive safety nets and post-harvest loss reduction (SO3), and common services including LTC/UNHAS (SO4). The CSP's planned resilience transition has been wholly subordinated to emergency response given conflict scale; SO5 remains fully suspended.

Funding Outlook:

• The 2026 Sudan HRP requires USD 2.9 billion; as of end-June 2026, only 31% (USD 899 million) has been received, leaving an approximately USD 2 billion gap. The Sudan Humanitarian Fund has allocated USD 95 million to cash-based assistance — the only identified specific sector allocation.^[7] UNICEF's 2026 HAC appeal is 71% unfunded (USD 684.8 million gap), with Child Protection 93% unfunded.^[18]
• WFP's six-month net funding requirement (June–November 2026) stands at USD 645.6 million, with a minimum floor of USD 460 million to sustain hyper-prioritised operations. The July 2026 pipeline depletion deadline is an immediate action-forcing event requiring emergency donor contributions at senior diplomatic levels, framed explicitly as a famine-escalation trigger.^[1]
• Global bilateral foreign aid to sub-Saharan Africa fell an estimated 16–28% in 2025, with humanitarian assistance contracting 40% — described by the IMF as historically unprecedented. Further aid reductions are expected as new multiyear budget cycles begin, eliminating any near-term replacement mechanism at scale.^[19] China is consolidating extractivist arrangements with the SAF junta; Western re-engagement posture remains constrained by access obstruction and donor fatigue.^[20]
• The FSL Cluster (co-led by WFP and FAO) has identified a USD 117 million funding gap for emergency agricultural support against a closing June 2026 planting window, with a documented USD 1:USD 29 return on sorghum seed investment. Missed planting season forfeits 2026 harvest and deepens 2027 food insecurity.^[21]

In The News

• Genocide Findings, El Obeid Siege Risk, and RSF Captagon Revenue (The New Humanitarian): UN fact-finding formally identifies genocide markers in El Fasher; RSF plans assault on El Obeid signal geographic expansion of atrocity patterns and threaten WFP's last viable operational corridors in Darfur and Kordofan.^[3]
• Sudan Child Casualties and North Kordofan Infrastructure Destruction (UNICEF Press): At least 330 child casualties in H1 2026; 500,000 civilians at risk in North Kordofan as drone strikes systematically destroy markets, water systems, and supply routes — directly degrading WFP last-mile delivery capacity.^[2]
• Unprecedented Aid Contraction Across Sub-Saharan Africa (Devex): 40% contraction in humanitarian assistance in 2025 with further cuts expected; multilateral buffers including WFP are themselves absorbing shortfalls, leaving Sudan with no viable near-term replacement mechanism for bilateral aid withdrawal.^[1,19]

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Potential Risks

Category	Title	Description	Potential Mitigations	Functional Areas	Support Resources	Evidence	Seriousness
Financial	Food pipeline depletion forcing simultaneous ration and caseload cuts	July 2026 pipeline depletion deadline without USD 460M emergency floor met will trigger simultaneous ration reductions in IPC5 areas (currently at 70%) and IPC4 areas (50%), risking famine deterioration across Al Fasher, Kadugli, and 14 additional famine-risk areas.	1. Emergency donor contributions mobilised at senior diplomatic level, framing July deadline as famine-escalation trigger. 2. Prioritise pipeline replenishment for confirmed famine areas before broader caseload.	Programme, Partnerships, Supply Chain	RB, HQ Donors Relations	WFP Sudan Country Brief May 2026 (doc_id: 4217639)	High
Strategic	Systemic 2026 humanitarian funding shortfall across all actors	HRP funded at 31% (USD 899M of USD 2.9B) as of end-June 2026; global bilateral aid to sub-Saharan Africa down 16–28% in 2025 with further cuts projected. No near-term replacement mechanism at scale. Structurally threatens multi-year operational viability.	1. Advocate at UNSC/G7 level framing Sudan as active famine requiring emergency response. 2. Diversify donor base beyond traditional bilateral channels; engage Gulf states and China through multilateral forums.	Partnerships, Advocacy	RB, HQ External Relations	Sudan Humanitarian Update May–June 2026 (doc_id: 4221008); Devex article (ref://1)	High
Operational	El Obeid siege and logistics hub collapse	RSF encirclement of El Obeid (27 drone strikes in June 2026) is destroying water, fuel, and power infrastructure in a city of ~3 million that serves as WFP's primary logistics node for North Kordofan. Cholera CFR of 13.7% compounds beneficiary vulnerability. Pattern mirrors pre-famine El Fasher siege.	1. Pre-position stocks outside El Obeid before access window closes. 2. Activate alternative routing via Chad corridor and assess South Sudan seasonal accessibility before rainy season cuts Al Na'am route.	Logistics, Access, Supply Chain	RB Logistics, UNHRD	UNICEF Press (ref://2); news articles (ref://48, ref://56); LTC SitRep #41 (doc_id: 4220473)	High
Operational	CBT transfer values materially under-resourced against food basket inflation	LFB cost at SDG 2,762/unit in May 2026 (+14% MoM, +49% YoY); parallel rate SDG 4,150/USD (-60% YoY); casual wages up only 3.7% MoM. Bankak conversion fees up to 20% further erode real value in RSF-held areas.	1. Trigger immediate CBT transfer value recalibration against May 2026 LFB cost. 2. Monitor parallel market rate monthly; set automatic review trigger if rate moves >5% in a single month.	Programme, VAM, Finance	RB Programme, WFP VAM	WFP Sudan Market Monitor June 2026 (doc_id: 4217107)	High
Operational	LTC Telecoms 100% unfunded, threatening operational communications	USD 5.5M 2026 LTC requirement entirely unfunded as of June 2026. Degraded communications across 67 sites in 7 hubs would compromise beneficiary safety reporting, supply chain coordination, and programme monitoring for ~1,700 humanitarian responders.	1. Urgent resource mobilisation coordinated across MENA/Eastern Europe and West and Central Africa RBs. 2. Identify bridge financing from internal WFP sources pending donor contributions.	ICT, Security, Logistics	ETC, RB ICT	LTC SitRep #41 June 2026 (doc_id: 4220473); ACR 2025 (doc_id: ACR)	High
Operational	Farchana–West Kordofan corridor fragility	Corridor resumed with only 40 mt in May 2026 after 9+ months of disruption; sustained pipeline not confirmed; rainy season threatens South Sudan alternative route at Al Na'am seasonally. Any security or logistics disruption re-severs the sole confirmed cross-border nutrition supply route into West Kordofan.	1. Sustain Chad-side logistics support and joint security monitoring to protect June distributions and future pipeline. 2. Preposition contingency stocks before rainy season closes Al Na'am.	Logistics, Access	RB Logistics, WFP Chad CO	WFP Sudan Country Brief May 2026 (doc_id: 4217639); Mercy Corps Darfur supply chain assessment July 2026	High
Strategic	Agricultural season forfeit deepening 2027 food insecurity	Millet 46% below five-year average, sorghum 10% below; input prices prohibitive (fertilizer +67% YoY, fuel doubled). FSL Cluster USD 117M gap against closing June 2026 planting window forfeits 2026 harvest and structurally worsens 2027 IPC outcomes. Women (85% of Darfur/Kordofan rainfed agriculture) disproportionately affected.	1. As FSL co-lead, advocate urgently for emergency seed/tool funding using USD 1:USD 29 sorghum ROI argument with donors. 2. Integrate agriculture-nutrition nexus into WFP transfer modality decisions where land access exists.	Programme, Partnerships	FAO, FSL Cluster, RB	FSL Cluster Advocacy Note May 2026; Mercy Corps Darfur Assessment July 2026	High
Operational	Secondary displacement from El Obeid toward White Nile State	Siege conditions and service collapse in El Obeid could generate secondary displacement southward. White Nile already hosts significant IDP concentration (391,000 reached via emergency CBT in May 2026). Secondary wave would strain existing caseload and logistics.	1. Monitor displacement flows from El Obeid before adjusting caseloads. 2. Pre-position contingency CBT resources in White Nile State given existing IDP concentration.	Programme, Logistics, VAM	RB, UNHCR	UNFPA Flash Update El Obeid 2 July 2026 (doc_id: 4220471); WFP Country Brief May 2026 (doc_id: 4217639)	Medium

Note: More than 154 documents were reviewed covering the period through July 2026. The intelligence is current as of 13 July 2026.

Discrepancies & Data Integrity:

• IPC Phase 5 population figures are internally inconsistent within UNICEF SitRep No. 43 (doc_id: 4220606), which simultaneously cites "approximately 135,000 in IPC Phase 5 (catastrophic)" and "over 5 million at IPC Phase 5" — the latter figure also appears in the WFP Sudan Country Brief May 2026 (doc_id: 4217639); the discrepancy likely reflects different analytical layers (point-in-time catastrophic vs. cumulative famine-phase population estimates) but cannot be resolved from available substrate, and both figures are preserved with attribution rather than one silently adopted.

Footnotes

1. WFP Sudan Country Brief — WFP, May 2026 (doc_id: 4217639)
2. UNICEF Press Release on Sudan Child Casualties H1 2026 — UNICEF, July 2026 (ref://2)
3. The New Humanitarian — El Fasher genocide findings and El Obeid siege risk, July 2026 (ref://3)
4. Sudan Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator first-hand account — The New Humanitarian, July 2026 (ref://12)
5. Sudan government counter-proposal to US humanitarian truce framework — news, July 2026 (ref://51)
6. Cholera outbreak Sudan — news aggregation, July 2026 (ref://43, ref://46)
7. Sudan Humanitarian Update May–June 2026 — OCHA, July 2026 (doc_id: 4221008)
8. El Obeid displacement hub and drone strikes — news, July 2026 (ref://33, ref://48)
9. Sudan Emergency IDP Site Mapping: Kordofan Region — REACH Initiative, May 2026 (doc_id: 4220833)
10. Women's Role in Agriculture in Sudan — GiHA Working Group/FSC, May 2026
11. Agriculture – Bridge from Emergency to Resilience — Solidarités International/FSC, May 2026
12. Agriculture and Agro-Processing in Sudan: Rapid Supply Chain Analysis in Darfur — Mercy Corps/FSC, July 2026
13. ACLED conflict data — HDX, July 2026
14. WFP Sudan Market Monitor — WFP/Logistics Cluster, June 2026 (doc_id: 4217107)
15. WFP-VAM rainfall/vegetation anomaly data — WFP VAM, dekad to 1 July 2026
16. Sudan conflict LTC Situation Report #41 — ETC/WFP, June 2026 (doc_id: 4220473)
17. WFP Sudan Annual Country Report — WFP, 2025 (ACR report_year: 2025)
18. UNICEF Sudan Humanitarian Situation Report No. 43 — UNICEF, 31 May 2026 (doc_id: 4220606)
19. Sub-Saharan Africa aid contraction — Devex, July 2026 (ref://1)
20. China-Sudan extractivist arrangements — The Diplomat, July 2026 (ref://8)
21. Emergency Agricultural Support in Sudan 2026–2028 — FSL Cluster/FAO/WFP, May 2026