Zambia Country Risk Update – 2026

Key Stats – Zambia 2026

Net Funding Requirements (NFRs):	N/A — no WFP Country Brief or SitRep in corpus; Zambia-specific NFR not available
Current Reach:	N/A — no WFP Country Brief or SitRep in corpus; per 2025 ACR, WFP reached 2,481,312 total unique beneficiaries in 2025
Population IPC 3+:	1,203,693 in Phase 3+ (12% of analysed pop., Aug 2025 IPC, obs. Apr–Sep 2025); projected 1,701,303 (17%) for Oct 2025–Mar 2026 — analysis 12 months old, situation likely improved given record 2026 harvest

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Executive Summary

Operational Context:

• Zambia's food security has improved markedly in mid-2026, underpinned by a record ~5 million metric tonne maize harvest. FEWS NET projects Stressed (IPC Phase 2) conditions in western and eastern areas and Minimal (IPC Phase 1) conditions elsewhere through September 2026.^[1]
• A critical structural ceiling limits recovery: only 14% of arable land is under cultivation and input access remains restricted, meaning lean-season deterioration to a caseload of 500,000–749,999 people requiring humanitarian food assistance in December 2026–January 2027 is a near-certain outcome, not a tail risk.^[1]
• The Zambian kwacha has depreciated nearly 5% since Middle East conflict onset, eroding the real value of cash-based transfers and increasing local procurement costs — requiring an immediate transfer value and procurement cost review.^[2]
• Zambia's August 13 tripartite elections are generating a deteriorating pre-election environment characterised by hate speech and political violence, per reporting from Zambia's leading religious bodies.^[3] Low ACLED-recorded conflict (5 events, 2 fatalities in June 2026; 0 in July 2026) does not yet reflect election-related tension.
• Under the 2023–2028 CSP, WFP operates across crisis response, nutrition, resilience, and capacity-strengthening outcomes, with a strategic pivot toward government system strengthening and eventual handover of school meals and shock-responsive social protection.^[4]

Vulnerability Scale:

• The most recent IPC analysis (August 2025, observing April–September 2025) recorded 1,203,693 people in Phase 3+ (12% of the 10,073,915 analysed population).^[5] This is 12 months old and likely overstates current acute need given the 2026 record harvest, but the projected lean-season caseload of 500,000–749,999 (Dec 2026–Jan 2027) from FEWS NET remains the operative planning figure.^[1]
• Zambia hosts over 100,000 refugees — predominantly from DRC — with 3,803 Congolese arrivals since January 2025, including 78 in June 2026 alone, indicating a modest but active inflow from ongoing eastern DRC displacement.^[6] Previously (2025 ACR): refugee rations were constrained to 70% due to pipeline pressures.^[7]
• A severe seasonal rainfall deficit affects 26 of 103 districts across Copperbelt, Central, and Muchinga provinces (worst: Masaiti at 52% of seasonal normal as of early July 2026), though vegetation remains near normal — indicating a watch-level precursor, not yet a crop or pasture failure.^[8]
• The DRC Ebola outbreak (2,073 confirmed cases, 796 deaths as of 17 July 2026) has been identified by OCHA as the most significant cross-border contagion risk for border-sharing countries including Zambia, with the IOM multi-country EVD preparedness plan only 37% funded (USD 20.8M received of USD 55.8M requested, leaving a USD 35M gap).^[9][10]

Trend Indicators:

• Improving: Record 2026 maize harvest driving most of Zambia to IPC Phase 1; previously (2025 ACR), 2025 expenditure reached 127% of implementation plan driven by new donor contributions and drought carry-over, indicating operational capacity.^[7]
• Deteriorating: UK bilateral aid to Zambia confirmed at ~£5M by 2028/29, effectively eliminating meaningful UK bilateral programming — compounding an already declining major-donor funding environment since 2024.^[11] Global fertiliser prices projected up 30%+ and energy prices up 24% from Strait of Hormuz disruptions, with direct pass-through to kwacha-denominated procurement costs.^[2]
• Watch: El Niño warning issued by UN ERC Tom Fletcher (July 2026) signals potential climate shock ahead of the 2026/27 planting season, which would directly threaten the structural agricultural gains underpinning current food security improvements.^[12]
• Previously (2025 ACR): SO2 (nutrition/root causes) reached 45% beneficiary achievement at 50% expenditure rate, underperforming due to funding phasing and SBC constraints; SO3 (resilience) reached 32% beneficiary achievement at 127% expenditure rate due to drought recovery restructuring.^[7]

WFP Operations:

• No WFP Country Brief or Situation Report is available in the corpus; current monthly reach, pipeline status, and funding runway for Zambia cannot be confirmed. The 2025 ACR records 2,481,312 total unique beneficiaries reached in 2025, against a 2023–2028 CSP whole-window plan of 640,750 beneficiaries — reflecting significant emergency-driven scale-up beyond planned scope.^[7][4]
• Previously (2025 ACR): SO1 (crisis response, including refugees) reached 120% beneficiary achievement at 140% expenditure rate; SO4 (capacity strengthening) reached 162% expenditure rate driven by time-limited contributions from France, Japan, and Finland requiring within-year execution. SO5 (on-demand logistics) reached only 50% expenditure at 50% of plan due to below-anticipated partner demand.^[7]
• The record 2026 harvest opens a local procurement window ahead of lean-season demand peaking in December 2026–January 2027. WFP should quantify pipeline headroom against the 500,000–749,999 caseload projection immediately.^[1]
• The Start Fund Crisis Anticipation window is confirmed operational (per the South Sudan anticipation alert, Alert 1098, funded in the previous cycle) and should be explored as an anticipatory financing mechanism for the lean season.^[13]

Funding Outlook:

• Cumulative CSP funding gap: 11.4% since CSP start (2023–2028 frame); in 2025, WFP spent USD 35.50M against an implementation plan of USD 27.95M (127% expenditure achievement), driven by time-limited new contributions and drought carry-over — a positive annual position within a modest cumulative shortfall.^[7]
• The UK's confirmed reduction of bilateral aid to Zambia to ~£5M by 2028/29 removes a traditional donor; Zambia is among nine African countries facing near-elimination of UK bilateral programming.^[11] Major donor funding has declined sharply globally since 2024 (ACAPS/ALNAP), creating structural competition for Zambia's lean-season resource mobilisation.^[2]
• Lean-season resource mobilisation for the December 2026–January 2027 caseload of 500,000–749,999 must begin within 60 days. A USD 35M gap in the IOM EVD regional preparedness plan constrains regional cross-border health capacity, indirectly raising WFP contingency costs.^[9]
• Data gap: Zambia-specific WFP net funding requirement, donor contributions, and pipeline break data are not available in the substrate.

In The News

• UK confirms 30–90% bilateral aid cuts to major WFP operational countries (Devex, 16 Jul 2026): UK FCDO confirms Zambia among nine African countries receiving only ~£5M by 2028/29, eliminating meaningful bilateral programming and compressing the donor base for lean-season resource mobilisation.^[11]
• UN ERC issues El Niño early warning (OCHA, 13 Jul 2026): Formal El Niño warning signals potential 2026/27 season climate shock that could reverse Zambia's food security gains; WFP should stress-test lean-season projections against a failed harvest scenario and accelerate anticipatory action planning.^[12]
• UNICEF: up to 23.4 million additional children into poverty from Middle East conflict shocks (UNICEF Press, 15 Jul 2026): Global fuel and food price surges from Strait of Hormuz disruptions are compounding kwacha depreciation and eroding purchasing power of cash-based transfers in Zambia, threatening effective programme reach ahead of the lean season.^[2]

Potential Risks

Category	Title	Description	Potential Mitigations	Functional Areas	Support Resources	Evidence	Seriousness
Financial	Lean-season pipeline shortfall	FEWS NET projects 500,000–749,999 people requiring assistance in Dec 2026–Jan 2027. No current pipeline or CSP headroom data available. Global donor decline and UK aid cuts compress resource base.	1. Immediately quantify Dec 2026–Jan 2027 caseload against pipeline and CSP allocation headroom. 2. Launch early donor mobilisation within 60 days. 3. Explore Start Fund Crisis Anticipation window (Alert 1098 precedent confirmed).	Programme, Partnerships, Supply Chain	RBJ, HQ Donor Relations	FEWS NET Food Security Outlook Jun–Jan 2027 (doc_id: 4221050); ACAPS Thematic Report 10 Jul 2026 (doc_id: 4220874)	High
Operational	Cross-border Ebola contagion from DRC	OCHA identifies DRC Ebola (2,073 cases, 796 deaths as of 17 Jul 2026) as the most significant cross-border risk for Zambia. IOM EVD plan only 37% funded (USD 35M gap). Potential disruption to border-area operations and staff movement.	1. Coordinate with WHO/OCHA on DRC–Zambia border contingency plan within 30 days. 2. Monitor IOM EVD plan funding status and advocate for gap closure.	Operations, Logistics, HR	WHO, OCHA, IOM, RBJ	OCHA Southern Africa Snapshot Jul 2026 (doc_id: 4221410); IOM EVD SitRep No. 8 (doc_id: 4220927)	High
Financial	Kwacha depreciation eroding transfer value	Kwacha down nearly 5% since Middle East conflict onset; global energy +24% and fertiliser +30%+ from Hormuz disruptions pass through to procurement and delivery costs.	1. Conduct immediate transfer value review and procurement cost reassessment. 2. Explore hedging options for local procurement.	VAM, Programme, Finance	RBJ Finance, HQ Treasury	ACAPS Thematic Report 10 Jul 2026 (doc_id: 4220874)	Medium
Strategic	Structural agricultural vulnerability limiting resilience	Only 14% of arable land under cultivation; limited input access. Record harvest masks fragility — lean-season deterioration is structurally embedded regardless of good seasons.	1. Align WFP SO3 resilience programming with input access and land utilisation gaps. 2. Use 2026 harvest window for local procurement and smallholder aggregation.	Programme (SO2, SO3), Government Capacity	FAO, Ministry of Agriculture, Farm to Market Alliance	FEWS NET Food Security Outlook Jun–Jan 2027 (doc_id: 4221050); 2023–2028 CSP	Medium
Strategic	Donor base contraction — UK bilateral elimination	UK confirms Zambia receives only ~£5M by 2028/29, near-eliminating bilateral programming. Compounds a global major-donor decline since 2024 and the 11.4% cumulative CSP funding gap.	1. Diversify donor pipeline toward non-traditional sources (climate finance, IFIs, private sector) as per CSP funding strategy. 2. Elevate case for Zambia lean-season funding within RBJ regional donor engagement.	Partnerships, Donor Relations	RBJ, HQ Resource Management	Devex 16 Jul 2026 (ref://2); ACAPS (doc_id: 4220874); 2025 ACR (doc_id: ACR-ZMB-2025)	Medium
Operational	Election-related instability disrupting operations	August 13 tripartite elections with documented hate speech and political violence risk. Low current ACLED figures (0 events Jul 2026) may not capture emerging tensions.	1. Activate pre-election access and security monitoring protocol. 2. Pre-position supplies in at-risk districts before election week.	Operations, Security, Logistics	UNDSS, RBJ Security	News intelligence (ref://27); ACLED Jul 2026	Medium
Operational	Congolese refugee inflow pressure on pipeline	3,803 Congolese refugees/asylum-seekers since Jan 2025 (78 in Jun 2026); previously (2025 ACR) refugee rations constrained to 70% due to pipeline pressures. Continued DRC instability sustains inflow risk.	1. Monitor monthly arrivals against refugee pipeline adequacy. 2. Coordinate with UNHCR on joint protection analysis and ration coverage review.	Programme (SO1), Supply Chain	UNHCR, RBJ	UNHCR Regional Update #39 Jun 2026 (doc_id: 4221204); 2025 ACR	Low
Operational	Seasonal rainfall deficit — watch-level precursor	26 of 103 districts with rainfall below 75% of normal (Masaiti: 52% of normal) in Copperbelt, Central, and Muchinga as of early July 2026. Vegetation near normal — no crop failure yet, but El Niño warning adds forward risk.	1. Monitor NDVI and rainfall trajectory through the planting window. 2. Integrate into lean-season scenario planning with FEWS NET.	VAM, Programme	FEWS NET, RBJ VAM	WFP VAM climate data (dekad to 2026-07-01); OCHA ERC statement (ref://3)	Low

Note: More than 44 documents were reviewed covering the period April 2026–July 2026. The intelligence is current as of 20 July 2026.

Discrepancies & Data Integrity:

• The IPC August 2025 observed figure of 1,203,693 people in Phase 3+ (12% of 10,073,915 analysed) and the FEWS NET June 2026 projected lean-season caseload of 500,000–749,999 (Dec 2026–Jan 2027) are not contradictory — they reflect different methodologies, periods, and populations — but the IPC analysis is 12 months old, the analysed population changed significantly between analyses (17,329,398 in Jul 2024 → 10,073,915 in Aug 2025), and the record 2026 harvest means the Aug 2025 IPC observation is likely to overstate current acute need; percentage comparisons are more reliable than absolute figures across these two analyses.

Footnotes

1. Zambia Food Security Outlook June 2026–January 2027 — FEWS NET, July 2026 (doc_id: 4221050)
2. Global Impacts of the Conflict in the Middle East — ACAPS Thematic Report, 10 July 2026 (doc_id: 4220874)
3. News intelligence: Zambia religious bodies pre-election warning, July 2026 (ref://27)
4. Zambia Country Strategic Plan 2023–2028 — WFP
5. IPC Acute Food Insecurity Analysis — August 2025, observing April–September 2025
6. Regional External Update #39: West and Central Africa Region — Eastern DRC Situation, June 2026 — UNHCR, July 2026 (doc_id: 4221204)
7. Annual Country Report 2025 — WFP Zambia (ACR report_year: 2025)
8. WFP VAM Climate/Rainfall Anomaly Data — dekad to 2026-07-01
9. Multi-Country Bundibugyo EVD Outbreak Situation Report No. 8, 29 June–5 July 2026 — IOM, July 2026 (doc_id: 4220927)
10. Southern Africa: Humanitarian Snapshot as of July 2026 — OCHA, 14 July 2026 (doc_id: 4221410)
11. UK FCDO bilateral aid allocations — Devex, 16 July 2026 (ref://2)
12. UN ERC El Niño early warning statement — OCHA, 13 July 2026 (ref://3)
13. Start Fund Monthly Risk Bulletin — Start Network, July 2026 (doc_id: 4219474)