Ethiopia Country Risk Update – 2026

Key Stats – Ethiopia 2026

Net Funding Requirements (NFRs):	USD 3.32B total 2026–2030 CSP; prior CSP 44.6% gap at end-2025; new contributions fell 52% YoY in 2025
Current Reach:	N/A — no WFP Ethiopia SitRep in current substrate; previously (2025 ACR): 5.5M beneficiaries reached
Population IPC 3+:	N/A — IPC data in substrate is May 2021 (62 months old); FEWS NET (Dec 2025–May 2026) projects Phase 4 (Emergency) in East Hararghe lowlands from Feb 2026; widespread Phase 3 across south/southeast

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Executive Summary

Operational Context:

• Ethiopia faces compounding internal and cross-border pressures entering the 2026 kiremt season. Conflict remains elevated — June 2026 recorded 290 conflict events and 638 fatalities (ACLED), broadly above the 12-month average of 253 events/680 fatalities/month — with violence ongoing across Amhara, Tigray, Oromia, and Afar constraining humanitarian access and commodity movement.^[1]
• Food prices are under severe stress: diesel surged +82% month-on-month (March 2026, WFP VAM), petrol +65%, beans +48%, onions +67%, sesame +56%, and wheat +10% — a broad-based supply-side shock reflecting fuel costs and ETB depreciation rather than isolated commodity volatility.^[2] The Strait of Hormuz conflict is cited by the FAO-WFP Joint Anticipatory Action Appeal as a compounding factor driving fuel, fertiliser, and food import costs — with direct transmission into Ethiopia's import-dependent supply chains.^[3]
• A news item (unverified, risk-rated 4/5) alleges first-time visual confirmation of an Ethiopian state-level logistics node actively supporting RSF military operations in Sudan's Blue Nile state — if verified, this would represent a material escalation in Ethiopia's regional conflict exposure and a reputational risk for WFP operations.^[4] This claim is unverified and should be treated accordingly.
• Under the 2026–2030 CSP, WFP targets up to 8.7M beneficiaries at a total cost of USD 3.32B, with explicit ambition to transition from relief to resilience and expand cash-based programming — but the plan's strategic risks section flags declining donor contributions and volatile security as the two primary structural threats to implementation.^[5]

Vulnerability Scale:

• FEWS NET (December 2025–May 2026 Outlook) projects IPC Phase 4 (Emergency) conditions emerging from February 2026 in East Hararghe lowlands, driven by near-total crop failure (54% zone-wide; complete failure in lowland woredas) — described as one of the worst production years on record for the zone.^[6] IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) is widespread across southern/southeastern pastoral zones (Dawa, Liben, Afder — Somali Region; Borena, East Borena — Oromia; South Omo) and emerging across Amhara, Tigray, and Afar through May 2026.
• The ICPAC/GHACOF 73 seasonal forecast (May 2026) projects 80% probability of below-normal JJAS 2026 rainfall over central, northeastern, and northwestern Ethiopia, with the probability of exceeding the agriculturally critical 500mm threshold reduced by 20–50 percentage points across the Ethiopian Highlands — compounded by 85% probability of above-normal temperatures driving evapotranspiration.^[7] El Niño persists at 96% probability through December 2026–February 2027.
• The FAO-WFP Joint Anticipatory Action Appeal (June 2026) explicitly lists Ethiopia among 10 countries with operational anticipatory action frameworks, targeting 3.9M people across Eastern Africa with a USD 68.3M funding gap.^[3] Northern Ethiopia faces drought risk June–September; eastern Ethiopia faces flood risk October–December — requiring differentiated targeting.
• Ethiopia hosts approximately 1.1 million refugees (UNHCR, June 2026), the second-largest refugee population in Africa.^[8] Up to 110,000 South Sudanese refugees in Gambela face potential mass return to Akobo — formally at risk of famine — requiring a joint WFP Ethiopia/WFP South Sudan contingency plan.^[9] Critically understaffed health services in Gambela are separately flagged by UNHCR High Commissioner Salih.^[8]

Trend Indicators:

• Conflict fatalities fell 24% month-on-month (May–June 2026: 845→638), but conflict event volume increased 2%, suggesting tactical dispersion rather than de-escalation.^[1]
• The kiremt rainfall deficit is already confirmed: WFP-VAM climate data (to 21 June 2026) shows severe seasonal rainfall deficit in 26 of 80 districts across Oromia, Somali, and Addis Ababa — worst in Hari/Zone 5 at 58% of normal — with NDVI below normal confirming agricultural/pasture stress.^[2]
• Drought-induced displacement from Somalia's Gaalkacyo District (3,500 households / 21,000 individuals, 18–22 June 2026, ongoing) is generating cross-border movement toward Wardher and Doollo, signalling inflow pressure on Ethiopia's Somali Region via the Dollo Ado corridor — beneficiary tracking and supply pre-positioning alignment between WFP Somalia and WFP Ethiopia has not been confirmed.^[10]
• Sudanese return movements from Ethiopia were recorded as of 30 June 2026 as part of a six-country simultaneous flow, requiring coordination with UNHCR, IOM, and Ethiopian authorities under different bilateral frameworks.^[11]

WFP Operations:

• No WFP Ethiopia SitRep or Country Brief is available in the current substrate. Previously (2025 ACR): WFP reached 5.5M beneficiaries with 193,825 MT food and USD 53.4M CBT; 270,000 people biometrically registered; nutrition recovery rates of 85% exceeded SPHERE standards; 23,000 MT locally procured injecting USD 17M into local economies.^[12]
• Previously (2025 ACR) SO-level performance: SO1 (Crisis Response) reached 85% beneficiary achievement at 89% expenditure rate — shortfall driven by funding gaps, strategic prioritisation, and handover completion in Afar/Amhara; refugee response funded at 83% of USD 149M requirement; ration cuts of up to 60% applied. SO4 (Capacity Strengthening) significantly underperformed at an estimated 41% funding rate, limiting implementable activities.^[12]
• Previously (2025 ACR): new donor contributions fell to USD 182M — a 52% reduction from USD 379M in 2024 — with 76% of contributions earmarked at activity level, severely limiting flexibility. USD 163M carried forward into 2026.^[12]
• The 2023 aid diversion crisis disrupted operations and eroded donor trust; the 2026–2030 CSP explicitly flags this as a structural funding risk requiring enhanced assurance measures and partner vetting.^[5]
• FEWS NET (May 2026) notes only 1.1M people confirmed receiving humanitarian food assistance in November 2025 (concentrated in Oromia, Tigray, Amhara) against estimated needs of 10.1M — EDRMC and WFP distribution data were unavailable, so actual reach is likely higher but unverifiable.^[6]

Funding Outlook:

• The 2026–2030 CSP carries a total cost of USD 3.32B for 8.7M planned beneficiaries over five years — but the plan is launching against a backdrop of a 44.6% prior-CSP funding gap and 52% YoY decline in new contributions (2025 ACR).^[5,12]
• Funding outlook for the kiremt 2026 response is structurally weak. The FAO-WFP Joint Anticipatory Action Appeal carries a USD 68.3M Eastern Africa funding gap (including Ethiopia).^[3] The prior CSP's 2025 refugee pipeline was funded at 83% of requirement with ration cuts already applied; no pipeline break or runway figure is available for 2026.
• The Strait of Hormuz conflict is driving fuel and commodity price escalation that directly inflates WFP's own delivery costs — an unquantified but material operational budget risk given the +82% diesel price shock already recorded in March 2026.^[2,3]
• Resource mobilisation under the 2026–2030 CSP targets diversification through BRICS Plus donors, IFIs, and private sector — but this transition is nascent and unlikely to offset near-term gaps from traditional donor contraction.^[5]

In The News

• UNHCR flags Ethiopia refugee health gaps and '50 by 35' displacement vision (UNHCR News): UNHCR High Commissioner Salih flagged critically understaffed health services in Gambela hosting 1.1M refugees — directly relevant to WFP's SO1 refugee response and the Gambela contingency planning gap.^[13]
• El Niño anticipatory action appeal: USD 68.3M Eastern Africa gap (Al Jazeera / FSC): The FAO-WFP Joint Anticipatory Action Appeal confirms Ethiopia's existing AA framework is operational but the Eastern Africa funding gap stands at USD 68.3M — the closing pre-kiremt window makes this action-forcing for the Country Office now.^[3]
• Strait of Hormuz blockade compounds food and fuel import costs (SCMP Asia): Stalled US-Iran negotiations and ~600 vessels stranded are maintaining effective closure of the strait; for Ethiopia, which faces +82% diesel prices already, further fuel cost escalation and fertiliser supply disruption could deepen the kiremt agricultural shock.^[2]

Potential Risks

Category	Title	Description	Potential Mitigations	Functional Areas	Support Resources	Evidence	Seriousness
Strategic	Kiremt 2026 Harvest Failure and El Niño Escalation	80% probability of below-normal JJAS rainfall across central/northeastern/northwestern Ethiopia (ICPAC GHACOF 73), reducing 500mm exceedance probability by 20–50 percentage points in key agricultural zones, compounded by 85% above-normal temperature probability. Risk of area-level Phase 4 emergence across pastoral south/southeast and highland cropping zones by September 2026.	1. Activate anticipatory action framework immediately in coordination with FAO; align trigger thresholds and partner rosters. 2. Begin advance procurement of cereals/pulses and pre-position before seasonal access constraints close. 3. Escalate USD 68.3M Eastern Africa AA funding gap to regional bureau and donors now.	Programme, Supply Chain, VAM	ICPAC, FAO, OCHA CERF	ICPAC JJAS 2026 Forecast (May 2026); FAO-WFP Joint AA Appeal (Jun 2026); FEWS NET Outlook Dec 2025–May 2026	High
Strategic	Gambela Refugee Mass-Return Shock and Akobo Famine Risk	Up to 100,000 South Sudanese refugees potentially returning from Gambela to Akobo — a county formally identified as at risk of famine. No joint WFP Ethiopia/WFP South Sudan contingency plan confirmed. Critically understaffed health services in Gambela compound vulnerability.	1. Develop joint contingency plan with WFP South Sudan and UNHCR covering ration continuity and cross-border commodity pre-positioning. 2. Engage UNHCR on durable solutions and status verification for affected populations in Gambela.	Programme, Supply Chain, Partnerships	WFP South Sudan, UNHCR, RBN	South Sudan Nutrition Cluster Q2 2026 Bulletin (doc_id: 4218944); UNHCR News (Jun 2026, ref://14)	High
Operational	Dollo Ado Corridor Cross-Border Inflow from Somalia	Drought-induced displacement (3,500 HH / 21,000 individuals, ongoing from 18 Jun 2026) from Gaalkacyo District toward Wardher and Doollo creates unplanned population inflow pressure on Ethiopia's Somali Region. Beneficiary tracking and supply pre-positioning alignment between WFP Somalia and WFP Ethiopia unconfirmed.	1. Establish immediate coordination mechanism between WFP Somalia and WFP Ethiopia for joint beneficiary tracking and supply pre-positioning at Dollo Ado corridor reception points. 2. Assess CSP allocation headroom for unplanned caseload absorption.	Programme, Logistics, Supply Chain	WFP Somalia, UNHCR	UNHCR Somalia PSMN Flash Alert 18 (22 Jun 2026, doc_id: 4218961)	High
Operational	Multi-Front Conflict Access Constraints and Logistics Disruption	Conflict persisting in Amhara, Tigray, Oromia, and Afar causing road blockages, fuel shortages, and commodity movement restrictions. June 2026: 290 events, 638 fatalities (above 12-month average). Counter-seasonal food price rises in East Hararghe directly reflect elevated transport costs.	1. Assess alternative access corridors and fuel pre-positioning strategies for Amhara/Tigray routes. 2. Evaluate in-kind vs CBT modality mix for thin-market lowland woredas where cash effectiveness is reduced. 3. UNHAS aviation prioritisation for Somali Region during rainy season inaccessibility.	Logistics, Programme, Security	UNHAS, Logistics Cluster, EDRMC	FEWS NET Outlook Dec 2025–May 2026; ACLED Jun 2026; WFP VAM Mar 2026	High
Financial	Fuel and Commodity Price Shock Eroding Operational Budget	Diesel +82% m/m, petrol +65% m/m (WFP VAM, March 2026), driven by ETB depreciation and Strait of Hormuz supply chain disruption. Unquantified but material inflation of WFP delivery costs against a budget already strained by 44.6% prior-CSP funding gap and 52% YoY decline in new contributions.	1. Quantify additional delivery cost exposure from fuel price shock and submit to regional bureau for emergency budget revision. 2. Dual-track fuel hedging and supplier diversification where feasible. 3. Accelerate local procurement (previously 23,000 MT in 2025) to reduce import-linked cost exposure.	Finance, Supply Chain, Programme	RBN Finance, WFP Global Commodity Management	WFP VAM Mar 2026; 2025 ACR (ETH); FAO-WFP AA Appeal Jun 2026	High
Financial	New Donor Contribution Collapse and Pipeline Vulnerability	New donor contributions fell 52% YoY to USD 182M in 2025; 76% of contributions earmarked at activity level. 2026–2030 CSP launches against a structural funding gap with no confirmed pipeline break data for current year. Refugee ration cuts of up to 60% already applied in 2025.	1. Immediate donor engagement to protect refugee pipeline (SO1 Activity 3) ahead of any further ration cuts. 2. Advocate for flexible, multi-year contributions to reduce earmarking constraint. 3. Accelerate diversification toward BRICS Plus and IFI financing per CSP resource mobilisation strategy.	Resource Mobilisation, Programme, Finance	Donors, RBN, WFP HQ	2025 ACR (ETH); 2026–2030 CSP (ETH)	High
Fiduciary	Reputational/Compliance Risk from 2023 Aid Diversion and Alleged Regional Logistics Allegation	The 2023 aid diversion crisis disrupted operations and eroded donor trust — the 2026–2030 CSP explicitly flags this as an ongoing structural risk. Separately, an unverified report (risk-rated 4/5) alleges an Ethiopian state-level logistics node supporting RSF operations in Sudan's Blue Nile state; if verified, this raises reputational and access risks for WFP's neutrality posture.	1. Maintain enhanced partner vetting, annual performance evaluations, incident management, and PSEA protocols per CSP fiduciary framework. 2. Monitor and assess the alleged Ethiopia-RSF logistics allegation; engage government counterparts to clarify and protect WFP's neutrality if substantiated. 3. Proactively communicate assurance measures to donors to rebuild trust post-2023.	Compliance, Programme, Partnerships	OIOS, RBN, Government of Ethiopia	2026–2030 CSP Strategic Risks; unverified news item (ref://57, 4/5 risk, 2 Jul 2026)	Medium
Operational	Sudan Return Movement Coordination Gap	Ethiopia is one of six countries from which Sudanese return movements were recorded as of 30 June 2026, requiring coordination with UNHCR (refugee status verification), IOM (movement tracking), and Ethiopian authorities under different bilateral agreements. Coordination failure risks assistance and protection gaps for returnees in transit.	1. Engage UNHCR and IOM within 30 days to establish a formal coordination mechanism for transit assistance. 2. Engage Ethiopian Refugees and Returnees Service to clarify bilateral obligations and access conditions.	Programme, Partnerships, Protection	UNHCR, IOM, RRS Ethiopia	CORE Sudan Situation 30 Jun 2026 (doc_id: 4219571)	Medium

Note: More than 87 documents were reviewed covering the period to 6 July 2026, supplemented by FSC intelligence (7 documents to June 2026), ACLED conflict data (June 2026), WFP VAM price data (March 2026), and news intelligence (60 articles). The intelligence is current as of 6 July 2026.

Discrepancies & Data Integrity:

• The IPC quantitative feed provides a May 2021 classification (Phase 3+: 5.5M of 9M analysed population) flagged as 62 months old and covering a different analysed population denominator than current estimates; this figure has been excluded from Key Stats and Vulnerability Scale in favour of the FEWS NET Dec 2025–May 2026 Outlook projections, which are the most recent authoritative food security assessment available in the substrate. No current IPC classification for Ethiopia is available, and this represents the most significant information gap for this briefing.

Footnotes

1. ACLED Ethiopia Conflict Data — ACLED via HDX, June 2026
2. WFP VAM Food Price Monitoring — WFP, March 2026
3. El Niño FAO-WFP Joint Anticipatory Action Appeal — FAO/WFP, June 2026 (fscluster.org/ethiopiaagric/document/el-nino-fao-wfp-joint-anticipatory)
4. Unverified news item alleging Ethiopian state logistics node supporting RSF, Blue Nile state — news aggregator, 2 July 2026 (ref://57; risk-rated 4/5; unverified)
5. WFP Ethiopia Country Strategic Plan 2026–2030 — WFP, 2026
6. FEWS NET Food Security Outlook Update December 2025–May 2026 — FEWS NET, May 2026 (fscluster.org/ethiopiaagric/document/fews-net-food-security-outlook-update)
7. ICPAC-IGAD June to September (JJAS) 2026 Seasonal Forecast — ICPAC, May 2026 (fscluster.org/ethiopiaagric/document/icpac-igad-june-september-jjas-2026)
8. UNHCR High Commissioner Barham Salih statement on '50 by 35' vision — UNHCR News, 29 June 2026 (ref://14)
9. South Sudan Nutrition Cluster Quarterly Bulletin Q2 2026 — Nutrition Cluster/UNICEF, July 2026 (doc_id: 4218944)
10. UNHCR Somalia Protection and Solutions Monitoring Flash Alert 18 — UNHCR, 22 June 2026 (doc_id: 4218961)
11. CORE Sudan Situation: Sudanese return from neighbouring countries as of 30 June 2026 — UNHCR, 5 July 2026 (doc_id: 4219571)
12. WFP Ethiopia Annual Country Report (ACR) 2025 — WFP, 2025
13. UNHCR News — Barham Salih, '50 by 35' vision, June 2026 (ref://14)