Sudan Country Risk Update – 2026

Key Stats – Sudan 2026

Net Funding Requirements (NFRs):	USD 457M gap vs USD 656M Jul–Dec 2026 requirement (30% funded as of 17 Jul 2026)
Current Reach:	3.7M people in Jun 2026 (2026 high), incl. 1M in famine-risk areas; 16,800 mt food + USD 14.7M cash
Population IPC 3+:	5.6M (proj., Jun–Sep 2026, Phase 3+, 67% of analysed pop.); 19.5M observed Phase 3+ (Feb–May 2026, 41% of pop.)

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Executive Summary

Operational Context:

• Sudan's conflict is in its third year with no ceasefire trajectory. ACLED records 112 events and 276 fatalities in July 2026 (to date), down 47% and 44% respectively from June's 212 events/496 fatalities — but well below the 13-month average of 245 events and 1,089 fatalities/month, suggesting partial rainy-season suppression rather than genuine de-escalation.^[1]
• El Obeid (North Kordofan) is an emerging acute flashpoint. RSF forces are reported within 30 km; drone strikes have systematically destroyed water, fuel, and market infrastructure in a city of 500,000 hosting 83,000 IDPs. A cholera outbreak (1,330 cases as of early July) is accelerating under rainy-season conditions. The pattern of deliberate infrastructure targeting and conflict-related sexual violence mirrors documented El Fasher dynamics.^[2],[3]
• A drone strike on Al Rahad's main market on 20 July 2026 during peak morning activity killed at least two children and four adults, directly destroying civilian food access infrastructure in North Kordofan. The Protection Cluster assesses further attacks on civilian infrastructure as likely, with displacement consequences.^[4]
• The Adre crossing (Chad–Darfur) was extended by Chad authorities through 30 September 2026 — a hard deadline. Darfur reached 1.9M people through this corridor in June. No post-September contingency corridor is confirmed.^[5]
• Sudan's economic emergency is compounding operational costs: the unofficial exchange rate reached SDG 4,750/USD (+14% m-o-m per WFP VAM); petrol is up 83% and diesel 144% year-on-year.^[6] The Strait of Hormuz closure and Houthi Red Sea disruptions are transmitting fuel and fertiliser price shocks regionally, with urea fertiliser in Darfur up >67% since May 2025.^[7]

Vulnerability Scale:

• The IPC June–September 2026 projection (operative for the current lean season) places 5.6M people in Phase 3+ (67% of the analysed population), including 2.2M at Phase 4. The most recent observed snapshot (Feb–May 2026) confirmed 19.5M in Phase 3+ nationally (41% of population), with 5M+ at IPC5.^[8]
• 65% of Sudan's 8.7M IDPs (as of 30 June 2026 per DTM) are concentrated in five Darfur states. Returns are accelerating — 4.6M recorded returnees (+5% m-o-m) — but 60% returned to damaged homes with acute food insecurity: food cited as priority need by 62–96% of returnees across all intended return states (UNHCR, n=5,138).^[9],[10]
• At Al Karama IDP sites (Blue Nile), 46% of 1,337 surveyed households rank food as their primary unmet need, ahead of water and health.^[11]
• In Darfur, agricultural input supply chains have structurally collapsed: large agri-businesses have departed, cooperatives have dissolved, and MoA extension services are non-functional. Farmers are deliberately reducing cultivated area due to prohibitive input costs, portending below-average harvests in late 2026 and deepening food insecurity into 2027.^[7]
• Severe seasonal rainfall deficit: 47 of 171 districts in Kassala, North Darfur, and Gedaref received below 75% of normal rainfall (worst: Sirba at 43%). NDVI depression confirmed in four districts — agricultural and pasture stress is high-confidence.^[12]

Trend Indicators:

• Worsening. All major food price indicators surged in June 2026: sorghum +22% m-o-m, vegetable oil +22%, beef +22%, millet +16%, wheat flour +14%, tomatoes +30%, salt +42%.^[6] The WFP Local Food Basket cost reached SDG 2,762/unit in May 2026 (+14% m-o-m, +49% y-o-y), while casual wages rose only 3.7% m-o-m — compressing purchasing power for CBT beneficiaries.^[13]
• Rations are already cut: 70% for IPC5 areas, 50% for IPC4 areas — a direct funding-driven measure implemented prior to the current reporting period.^[14]
• Border flows at Adré surged 56% m-o-m in June (1,319 individuals at Adré and Tiné combined); 100% cite armed conflict; 63% originate from El Fasher — sustained active-conflict pressure on Darfur.^[15]
• Previously (2025 ACR): WFP reached 12.1M people (beneficiary-achievement rate 117.8% for SO1 vs. plan, at 97.9% expenditure rate) — a strong operational year funded at 86% of annual needs (USD 678.5M contributions). The 2026 funding trajectory is materially worse: only USD 199M received against a USD 656M Jul–Dec requirement.^[16]

WFP Operations:

• WFP reached 3.7M people in June 2026 — 2026 high — including 1M in Risk of Famine areas (El Fasher: 108,000, highest since July 2023; Tawila: 666,000). CBT reached 1.4M people — highest since conflict onset — including ~340,000 in Tawila (up 240,000 vs May) and ~134,000 in new localities (As Salam, Nyala Janoub, Nyala Shimal).^[5]
• Northeast Sudan hosts large IDP concentrations: Kassala (224,000 reached), White Nile (395,000), Gedaref (136,000), River Nile (78,000), Northern (94,000), Red Sea (28,000).^[5]
• The Farchana–West Kordofan nutrition corridor dispatched 40 mt in May 2026 after 9+ months of disruption — a fragile restoration requiring sustained Chad-side logistics support and joint security monitoring.^[14]
• LTC Telecoms: USD 5.5M 2026 requirement entirely unfunded as of June 2026, sustaining connectivity for ~1,700 responders across 67 sites in 7 hubs. Loss of this service would compromise beneficiary safety, supply chain coordination, and real-time monitoring across all Sudan operations.^[17]
• Under the 2019–2026 CSP, SO5 (policy/institutional development) remained fully suspended due to political instability. The THABAT World Bank-financed resilience project reached Additional Financing round 3, offering a complementary development anchor if security permits.^[18]
• WFP and aid agencies are explicitly identified by market actors as the sole external liquidity source in Darfur, with Bankak mobile transfer (20% cash-conversion fee) the only functioning financial instrument — a critical CMBA design constraint.^[7]

Funding Outlook:

• Critical: USD 199M received against USD 656M Jul–Dec 2026 requirement (30% funded as of 17 July 2026) — gap of USD 457M. CBT is ~50% funded from July onwards. The minimum floor to sustain hyper-prioritised operations is USD 460M (per May 2026 Country Brief).^[5],[14]
• The 2025 ACR cumulative CSP funding gap stands at 30.98% since CSP start — a structural underfunding pattern predating the current cliff. Annual contributions in 2025 were USD 678.5M (86% of annual needs), down sharply from 158% in 2024 — but 2026 is on track to be significantly worse.^[16]
• Structural donor risks: USDA's effective dismantlement of Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) capacity — administering Food for Peace / PL480 — threatens a critical US commodity and financing pipeline for WFP globally, including Sudan.^[19] UK FCDO multi-year aid cuts and EU aid restructuring under the proposed Global Europe instrument add further downside risk to the 2026–2027 resource environment.^[20]
• Without emergency contributions meeting at minimum the USD 460M floor, simultaneous ration and caseload cuts are unavoidable, risking famine deterioration in IPC5 areas currently on 70% rations.^[14]

In The News

• Drone Strike on Ar Rahad Market, North Kordofan (UNICEF Press): The 20 July 2026 drone strike on Ar Rahad market killed at least 6 people including 2 children and injured 26+, directly destroying civilian food access infrastructure — consistent with the replicating El Fasher/El Obeid infrastructure-targeting pattern now threatening North Kordofan operations.^[4]
• USDA FAS Relocation Effectively Dismantles Food for Peace Capacity (Devex): Fewer than 4% of 277 surveyed FAS staff are willing to relocate to Kansas City, representing near-total attrition of the agency administering PL480 — a structural threat to WFP's US commodity and financing pipeline at the worst possible moment for Sudan funding.^[19]
• El Obeid Pre-Collapse Status, North Kordofan (news): RSF forces within 30 km, systematic drone destruction of water and distribution infrastructure, and cholera outbreak among 500,000+ population (83,000 IDPs) signals a second El Fasher-pattern protection and access collapse on the only major Khartoum–Darfur supply corridor.^[3]

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Potential Risks

Category	Title	Description	Potential Mitigations	Functional Areas	Support Resources	Evidence	Seriousness
Financial	Critical Funding Cliff & Pipeline Depletion	USD 457M gap vs USD 656M Jul–Dec requirement (30% funded). Food stocks projecting to deplete from July; CBT ~50% funded. Rations already at 70% (IPC5) and 50% (IPC4). Simultaneous caseload and ration cuts imminent without emergency contributions.	1. Emergency donor mobilisation targeting USD 457M gap. 2. Maintain operations at minimum USD 460M floor. 3. Trigger immediate CBT transfer value recalibration against SDG 2,762/unit LFB cost.	Programme, Partnerships, Finance	RBN, Headquarters	WFP Sudan Country Brief Jul 2026 (doc_id: 4222897); WFP Sudan Country Brief May 2026 (doc_id: 4217639)	High
Operational	Adre Crossing Expiry & Darfur Supply Severance	Chad authorities' extension expires 30 September 2026. Darfur reached 1.9M people through this corridor in June. No post-September contingency corridor confirmed. Rainy season further degrades alternative access.	1. Maximise prepositioning through Adre before 30 September. 2. Initiate post-September contingency corridor plan immediately with RBN and Chad CO. 3. Joint Chad–Sudan pipeline analysis before rainy-season window closes.	Logistics, Programme, Partnerships	RBN, WFP Chad CO, Logistics Cluster	WFP Sudan Country Brief Jul 2026 (doc_id: 4222897)	High
Strategic	El Obeid / North Kordofan Access Collapse	RSF within 30 km of El Obeid; systematic drone strikes on water, fuel, and market infrastructure; cholera outbreak (1,330 cases); 83,000 IDPs. Pattern replicates El Fasher dynamics. Threatens the sole Khartoum–Darfur transit corridor and North Kordofan operations.	1. Immediate contingency routing assessment for Khartoum–Darfur corridor bypassing El Obeid. 2. Engage Protection Cluster early warning mechanism for market infrastructure attacks. 3. Preposition commodities in advance of corridor closure.	Logistics, Access, Safety & Security	RBN, UNDSS, Protection Cluster	Protection Cluster Alert North Kordofan 23 Jul 2026 (doc_id: 4222822); news refs ref://33, ref://45	High
Fiduciary	CBT Transfer Value Erosion	Unofficial exchange rate SDG 4,750/USD (+14% m-o-m); LFB SDG 2,762/unit (+14% m-o-m, +49% y-o-y); casual wages +3.7% m-o-m. CBT values based on prior costings are materially under-resourced. Bankak 20% cash-conversion fee further erodes real transfer value.	1. Immediate CBT transfer value review against current LFB costing. 2. Monitor parallel market rate trajectory. 3. Assess voucher/in-kind modality substitution in Bankak-constrained areas.	Programme, VAM, Finance	RBN, WFP Sudan VAM	WFP Sudan Market Monitor Jun 2026 (doc_id: 4217107); FSC Darfur Supply Chain Analysis Jul 2026	High
Operational	Humanitarian Telecoms Funding Void	USD 5.5M 2026 LTC Telecoms requirement entirely unfunded (June 2026). Sustains ~1,700 responders across 67 sites in 7 hubs. Service degradation would compromise beneficiary safety reporting, supply chain coordination, and programme monitoring.	1. Escalate telecoms gap to donors as a cross-cutting operational enabler alongside food pipeline. 2. Explore emergency bridging from WFP operational budget pending donor contributions.	ETC, IT, Operations	ETC, RBN, Headquarters	LTC Situation Report #41 Jun 2026 (doc_id: 4220473)	High
Operational	Farchana–West Kordofan Corridor Fragility	40 mt nutrition dispatch in May 2026 after 9+ months disruption — corridor remains operationally fragile. Rainy season threatens South Sudan (Al Na'am) route simultaneously. RSF operations along the border drive continued cross-border displacement.	1. Sustained Chad-side logistics support and joint security monitoring. 2. WFP Sudan–Chad joint pipeline analysis. 3. Preposition before South Sudan route is cut by rainy season.	Logistics, Programme	WFP Chad CO, RBN	WFP Sudan Country Brief May 2026 (doc_id: 4217639); FSC Darfur Supply Chain Analysis Jul 2026	Medium
Strategic	Global Fuel & Commodity Price Shock (Hormuz/Red Sea)	Strait of Hormuz effective closure and Houthi Red Sea disruptions are transmitting fuel/fertiliser shocks to Sudan. Darfur urea fertiliser up >67% since May 2025; diesel +144% y-o-y. Oil above USD 100/barrel threatens WFP transport costs and local procurement across 2026 budget.	1. Re-cost transport budget assumptions against current fuel price trajectory. 2. Forward-contract fuel where operationally feasible. 3. Advocate through FSC for checkpoint exemptions on agricultural inputs per Darfur supply chain assessment.	Logistics, Finance, Supply Chain	RBN, Procurement, Headquarters	FSC Darfur Supply Chain Analysis Jul 2026; WFP Sudan Country Brief May 2026 (doc_id: 4217639); news ref://3	Medium
Financial	Structural US Donor Pipeline Risk	USDA FAS relocation is effectively eliminating PL480/Food for Peace operational capacity (<4% staff willing to relocate). Combined with 2025 US voluntary contribution contraction, this poses a structural threat to WFP Sudan's commodity and financing pipeline at the worst-funded moment in 2026.	1. Immediate diversification of commodity sourcing away from PL480-dependent pipeline. 2. Engage non-traditional donors (Gulf states, EU emergency instruments). 3. RBN/Headquarters donor mapping for 2026–2027 pipeline replacement options.	Partnerships, Finance, Supply Chain	Headquarters, RBN	Devex Jul 2026 (ref://2); news ref://46	High

Note: More than 305 documents were reviewed covering the period to 27 July 2026. The intelligence is current as of 27 July 2026.

Discrepancies & Data Integrity:

• Two WFP six-month funding requirement figures coexist from rolling windows: USD 645.6M (Jun–Nov 2026, May Country Brief, doc_id 4217639) and USD 656M (Jul–Dec 2026, July Country Brief, doc_id 4222897) — these are sequential windows, not contradictory; the July 2026 figure is the operative current requirement and is used throughout this brief. The IPC projection figure (5.6M Phase 3+, Jun–Sep 2026) is operative for the current lean season but derives from the January 2026 analysis cycle — a 7-month-old analytical base; the WFP May 2026 Country Brief's reference to the IPC Special Snapshot (14 May 2026, 19.5M Phase 3+ nationally) is the most recent observed national figure and is presented as such.

Footnotes

1. ACLED via HDX, monthly aggregates — Jul 2026 (partial) vs Jun 2026
2. News ref://33 — El Obeid pre-collapse analysis, Jul 2026; news ref://40 — El Obeid infrastructure collapse, Jul 2026
3. News ref://45, ref://50, ref://55 — El Obeid protection/access/cholera convergence, Jul 2026
4. Sudan Protection Cluster Alert: Attacks on Critical Civilian Infrastructure in North Kordofan — Protection Cluster/UNHCR, Jul 2026 (doc_id: 4222822); UNICEF Press ref://8
5. WFP Sudan Country Brief, July 2026 — WFP, Jul 2026 (doc_id: 4222897)
6. WFP VAM via HDX food price data — WFP, Jun 2026; WFP Sudan Country Brief May 2026 (doc_id: 4217639) for fuel figures
7. Agriculture and Agro-Processing in Sudan: Rapid Supply Chain Analysis — Mercy Corps/FSC, Jul 2026 (https://fscluster.org/sudan/document/agriculture-and-agro-processing-sudan)
8. IPC Acute Food Insecurity data — Jan 2026 analysis, Feb–May 2026 observed / Jun–Sep 2026 projection
9. DTM Sudan Displacement and Return Snapshot (7) — IOM, Jul 2026 (doc_id: 4222779)
10. CORE Sudan: Sudanese Returns from Neighbouring Countries — UNHCR, 15 Jul 2026 (doc_id: 4222280)
11. WASH Needs Assessment – Blue Nile, Sudan — UNICEF/WASH Cluster, Jun 2026 (doc_id: 4222392)
12. WFP VAM rainfall/NDVI anomaly data — dekad to 1 Jul 2026
13. WFP Sudan Market Monitor — WFP/Logistics Cluster, Jun 2026 (doc_id: 4217107)
14. WFP Sudan Country Brief, May 2026 — WFP, May 2026 (doc_id: 4217639)
15. Chad–Sudan Crisis Response: Situation Update 66 — IOM, Jun 2026 (doc_id: 4222772)
16. Sudan ACR 2025 — WFP, 2025
17. Sudan conflict — LTC Situation Report (Telecoms Area) #41 — ETC/WFP, Jun 2026 (doc_id: 4220473)
18. Stakeholder Engagement Plan – THABAT Sudan — WFP, Mar 2026 (doc_id: 4218807)
19. Devex, Jul 2026 (ref://2) — USDA FAS relocation analysis
20. Devex, Jul 2026 (ref://21) — INGO sector structural transformation; Devex Jul 2026 (ref://19) — EU Global Europe instrument